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ARTICLE
Melinda A. Marbes
Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of
Judicial Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and
Changing the Substance of Disqualification Standards to
Eliminate Cognitive Errors
Abstract. In recent years a number of high profile disqualification
disputes in the federal and state courts have caught the attention of the media
and the public. These cases have involved such controversial subjects as
abortion, judicial elections, health insurance reform, same sex marriage, and
the death penalty. In each instance, there has been an outcry from some
segment of the press and the public when a presiding jurist was asked to
recuse but declined to step aside. Unfortunately, even if the jurist writes a
decision explaining his refusal to recuse, the reasons given often are
unsatisfying and do little to quell suspicions of bias. Instead, the litigants,
members of the press, and the public are left questioning whether the jurist
actually is unbiased in the specific case and even doubting the impartiality of
the judiciary as a whole.
This negative reaction to refusals to recuse is caused, at least in part, by
politically charged circumstances that cause further suspicions of the jurists’
motives. However, another significant problem underlying this disconnect
between the perception of judicial bias by the bench and the public is the bias
blind spot, a cognitive illusion that creates asymmetries in people’s
perceptions of bias in themselves versus their perception of bias in others.
While jurists always have and always will decide some of the most
controversial legal (and political) issues in our society, we can address this
disconnect by reforming how disqualification decisions are made and the
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substantive standards applied in such with disputes. The hope is such changes
will help build consensus about when a jurist should be disqualified in order
to protect litigants’ rights to a fair tribunal and to bolster public confidence in
the judiciary.
This Article proposes that all federal and state courts adopt one of two
methods for deciding disqualification depending on the substantive
standard—per se or catch-all rules—underlying the recusal request. If the
challenge is based upon a specific per se rule, then the task involves less
discretion and the challenged jurist may safely serve as the initial decision
maker of whether recusal is warranted. Of course, in such instances the
appearance of bias standard must be used because this lower threshold helps
counter the bias blind spot when “self-judging” is involved. However, if the
challenge is based upon the general catch-all provision, then discretion must
be exercised and, possibly, a new rule developed–at least if there is no existing
case on point. In that instance, the challenged jurist may determine the
sufficiency of the factual averments on which relief is requested, but another
jurist or group of jurists (the entire court, an appellate court, or a specially
appointed panel) must make the decision of how the substantive standard
applies to those facts. Since no “self-judging” is involved because the
challenged jurist does not decide his own bias, the higher “probability of bias”
standard articulated in Caperton may be applied to determine if the challenged
jurist must be disqualified.
This two-pronged approach is designed to: (1) counter the likely impact of
the bias blind spot, a cognitive illusion that creates an asymmetry in
perceptions of bias in self and others; and (2) avoid pointless disqualification
disputes that unnecessarily undermine the judiciary’s generally well-earned
reputation for impartiality. Also, this dual decision-making methodology
offers the best protection of litigants’ due process rights to a fair trial while at
the same time fostering public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary
by avoiding the greatest risks of how the bias blind spot affects
disqualification decisions.
Author. Melinda Marbes is a graduate of Emory University School of
Law, J.D. 1988, and Emory College, B.A. 1985. She is grateful for the able
assistance provided by Louis Rosen, an Assistant Professor of Law Library
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and Reference Librarian at Barry Dwayne O. Andreas University School of
Law, who aided with this article while she served as a visiting professor at the
law school. The author also appreciates the hard work of the editorial board
and staff of the St. Mary’s Law Journal, especially Marissa Olsen the Editor in
Chief, Kristie Duchesne, and Trevor Gallaway in preparing this piece for
publication. The author states that none of these individuals is responsible for
the opinions expressed or any mistakes made—she takes sole responsibility
for those errors.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a number of high profile disqualification disputes in
federal and state courts have caught the attention of the media and the
public. These cases have involved controversial subjects such as abortion,
death penalty, judicial elections, health insurance reform, and same-sex
marriage. In each instance, there has been an outcry from segments of the
public and the press when a presiding jurist was asked to recuse
themselves but declined to step aside. Unfortunately, even if the jurist
writes a decision explaining their refusal to recuse, the reasons given are
often unsatisfying and do little to quell suspicions of bias. Instead, the
litigants, members of the press, and the public are left questioning whether
the jurist actually is unbiased in the specific case and even doubting the
impartiality of the judiciary as a whole.
This negative reaction to refusals to recuse is caused in part by the “bias
blind spot” which creates asymmetries in people’s perceptions of bias in
themselves versus their perception of bias in others. The difference in
perception also colors the jurist’s disqualification decisions and can create
situations where it seems obvious to persons other than the challenged
jurist to require recusal. These asymmetries in perception of bias between
the bench, on the one hand, and the bar and public on the other, conflict
with the long-standing presumption of impartiality that underlies judicial
recusal rules.
In addition, these differences in perceptions and
presumptions of impartiality are exacerbated by the context in which some
242
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disqualification decisions play out (i.e., politically charged circumstances)
that cast further suspicions on the jurists’ motives. Currently, public
confidence in all branches of our government, including the judiciary, is at
a historic low. This waning level of trust in our government institutions
may not be unwarranted given growing evidence of strategic decisionmaking by judges. However, the distrust further aggravates the perception
of a partiality problem. Thus, this Article proposes reforms of the
substantive standards applied in disqualification disputes with the hopes of
building consensus about how to decide when a jurist should be
disqualified to protect litigants’ rights to a fair tribunal and to bolster
public confidence in the judiciary.
Specifically, this Article recommends all federal and state courts should
adopt one of two substantive standards for disqualification depending on
who makes the initial disqualification decision. First, if the challenged
jurist is the initial decisionmaker, then the decision should be limited to
applying the specific per se rules for partiality and passing on the accuracy
of the factual allegations of bias when the “catch-all” substantive standard
is pled. When the challenged jurist is the initial decisionmaker, the
evidentiary standard should remain the “appearance of bias” standard
because this lower evidentiary threshold better accounts for the impact of
the bias blind spot. Second, however, if another jurist, the entire court, or
another court is the initial decision maker, then there should be no limit on
the decision maker’s authority to decide disqualification claims made under
either the per se or the “catch-all” rules, or both. Also, given that the bias
blind spot will have limited, if any, impact on these decisionmakers, the
higher evidentiary threshold of “probability of bias,” as articulated in
Caperton,1 should be applied. This two-pronged approach is designed to:
(1) balance the realities of judging (including the impact of the bias blind
spot) against our ideals about judges embedded in the presumption of
impartiality; and (2) avoid jurists’ resistance to recusal reforms by
recognizing the judiciary’s generally well-deserved reputation for
impartiality. Thus, these dual standards are offered as a way to preserve
meaningful protection for litigants’ due process rights while at the same
time fostering public confidence in the impartiality of individual jurists and
the judiciary as a whole.

1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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In support of this thesis, Part II of this Article introduces the most
prevalent and persistent problems with disqualification decisions using a
series of examples from the United States Supreme Court and the highest
state courts. Part III briefly examines the history of the development of
recusal laws, including the development of the presumption of impartiality
and the resistance by the judiciary to recusal reform. Part IV describes
emerging perspectives on judging based upon new social science so the
reforms for substantive standards suggested in this Article can be
evaluated for effectiveness. Part V briefly summarizes the current state of
disqualification law in the federal and state courts and includes a discussion
of how the bias blind spot impacts judging under the current procedures
and substantive rules. Part VI proposes reforms to recusal rules and
explains how the proposed reforms will preserve the presumption of
impartiality in appropriate ways. This Article concludes by suggesting the
proposed recusal reforms will further the goal of impartiality by creating
disqualification standards that are, or at least appear to be, fair and
unbiased.
II. PROBLEMS AND PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIALITY
In recent years, the most well-known disqualification disputes in the
highest federal and state courts have involved very controversial subjects,
including abortion2, the death penalty3, elections—both judicial4 and
2. See GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2004),
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/19/nation/na-ginsburg19 (reporting on a letter written by
thirteen Republican Congress members requesting that Ruth Bader Ginsburg recuse herself from all
future abortion cases based upon her association with NOW Legal Defense Fund).
3. See Raymond Bonner, Three Abstain as Supreme Court Declines to Halt Texas Execution, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/14/us/three-abstain-as-supreme-courtdeclines-to-halt-texas-execution.html (proclaiming three Supreme Court justices disqualified
themselves from a stay of execution case because the judges had ties to the murder victim’s son); see
also Mark Davis, Did Judge in Connecticut Death Penalty Decision Have Conflict, NEWS 8,
http://wtnh.com/2015/08/14/did-judge-in-connecticut-death-penalty-decision-have-conflict/ (last
updated Aug. 15, 2015) (discussing the controversy surrounding a Connecticut supreme court justice
who refused to recuse himself in a case overturning the Connecticut death penalty statute where, as
the governor’s legal counsel, he advised against the bill prior to being appointed to the high court);
Adam Liptak, Questions of an Affair Tainting Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/us/23bar.html (examining a case in which a man was
sentenced to death by a judge who was engaged in a sexual relationship with the prosecutor in the
case).
4. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 (finding a state supreme court justice required recusal for
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executive5, health insurance reform6, and same-sex marriage.7 It is not
surprising that concerns about the possibility of partial jurists are
magnified when the stakes of a case are higher for the litigants and the
public at large.8 Also, media attention on such highly political cases is
participating in a case involving a company whose CEO gave over $3 million in campaign donations
while an appeal was pending).
5. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157–58 (2000) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (referring to public
confidence in the judiciary as a “public treasure” that s a “vitally necessary ingredient of any
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself”); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill,
Do Appearances Matter: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court In Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606,
608 (2002) (reviewing allegations that surfaced in 2000 suggesting Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and
Thomas disqualify themselves in the controversial Bush v. Gore case because of their connection to
the litigants in the case and a possible appearance of not being impartial); Richard K. Neumann, Jr.,
Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 379
(2003) (considering whether allegations surrounding certain Justices’ alleged impartiality in Bush v.
Gore would be considered conflicts of interest under the law to justify an investigation into the facts
surrounding the allegations).
6. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill & Eric J. Segal, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 331, 335–36 (debating whether Justices Thomas and Kagan should step aside and not
take part in the case challenging the insurance mandate under the Affordable Care Act, and whether
there is a need for recusal rules governing the Supreme Court Justices).
7. See, e.g., Motion of Amicus Foundation for Moral Law for Recusal of Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556)
http://morallaw.org/2015/06/16/foundation-files-motion-for-recusal/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017)
(alleging Justices Ginsburg and Kagan were biased because they performed same-sex marriages).
Interestingly, the movant acknowledges in its filing as an amicus, rather than an actual party to the
appeal, the Foundation for Moral Law may not have standing to file the motion; but it asks the
Justices to consider the issue in spite of any standing flaw. There is no notation on the docket of
whether the request was reviewed, but both Justices Ginsburg and Kagan took part in the Supreme
Court’s decision, as did Justice Scalia who had repeatedly written or made public remarks about the
amorality of same-sex unions. See Peter Hardin, Should Scalia Recuse in Same-Sex Marriage Cases?,
GAVEL GRAB (Dec. 17, 2012), http://gavelgrab.org/?p=49589 (addressing the debate on whether
Justice Scalia may have a bias strong enough to require recusal from hearing same-sex marriage
cases); see also Heather Clark, Legal Group Seeks Recusal of Justices as Supreme Court Considers Same-Sex
‘Marriage’ Case, 108 PRAISERADIO (Apr. 28, 2015), www.108praiseradio.com/?p=274563 (“A
Christian legal organization in Alabama has filed a motion urging the recusal of two U.S. Supreme
Court justices who have officiated same-sex ‘weddings’ . . . .”). See generally Motion of Amicus
Foundation for Moral Law for Recusal of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan,
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), http://morallaw.org/2015/06/16/
foundation-files-motion-for-recusal/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (outlining reasons Justices Ginsberg
and Kagan should not participate in a same-sex marriage opinion).
8. See, e.g., Margaret McKeown, To Judge or Not to Judge: Transparency and Recusal in the Federal
System, 30 REV. LITIG. 653, 654–56 (2011).
Public discourse about recusal is a positive development, yet media coverage is often anecdotal
and obscures the reality of a robust disqualification regime. This may be because it often
focuses on the egregious conduct of a few individual judges. Rarely has a controversy arisen
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magnified when the disputes become part of the 24-hour news cycle with
the possibility of perceptions of partiality skewing the discussion.9 Of
course, the perceptions of partiality proffered by the litigants, the press,
and segments of the public often differ from the jurist’s beliefs about their
own partiality.10 This difference in perception is the most significant
consequence of the bias blind spot,11 a cognitive illusion that causes each
of us to judge our own impartiality using introspective evidence, which is
different from the extrospective evidence relied upon by others when
assessing the jurists’ impartiality.12 Thus, it is clear that differences in
perceptions of partiality are more likely to arise and disqualification
disputes are more likely to be litigated or debated in high-stakes cases.

over a judge’s decision to recuse in a case. Rather, the cascade of publicity has arisen in cases in
which the judge decided not to recuse. . . . [P]ublished decisions suggest that litigants have not
shied away from challenging judges. . . . As would be expected, recusal in not required for
challenges based on substantive legal determination, unfavorable rulings, adverse evidentiary
findings, or dissatisfaction with case management techniques.
Id.
9. See Robert Barnes, Health-Care Case Brings Fights About Which Supreme Courts Justices Should
Decide It, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
health-care-case-brings-fight-over-which-supreme-court-justices-should-decide-it/2011/11/22/
gIQAwRWb2N_story.html (reporting on various calls for Justice Thomas and Justice Kagan to
recuse themselves from hearing appeal challenging validity of Affordable Care Act when the media
coverage and controversy was at its peak).
10. See Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Disqualification
Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. LAW REV. 235, 237–38 (2013)
[hereinafter Refocusing Recusals] (exploring how the asymmetries in perception of bias between self and
others lie at the heart of the bias blind spot distorting decision-making in disqualification disputes
and negatively affecting the debate about proper recusal reforms); see also Melinda A. Marbes,
Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decision-maker Bias and Promoting Public Confidence, 49 VAL. U. L.
REV. 807, 848–58 (2015) [hereinafter Reshaping Recusal Procedures] (discussing the various recusal
procedures currently used by federal and state courts and proposing reforms designed to address the
impact of the bias blind spot in disqualification decisions).
11. See Nathan A. Heflick, We Struggle with Objectivity: The Bias Blind Spot, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
(Dec. 17, 2012) https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-big-questions/201212/we-struggleobjectivity-the-bias-blind-spot (“Research shows that when we have a ‘bias blind spot’ . . . [where]
people rate themselves as less susceptible to a variety of biases that others.”).
12. The Supreme Court has indirectly acknowledged the difference in perceptions of partiality.
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 870 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 47 (1975) (stating the challenged jurists’ assessment of his own bias is subjective, but a reviewing
court should ask “whether ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness’” the interest poses a serious risk of personal bias)).
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This problem of differing perceptions of partiality, especially in
controversial cases, was the main issue in a disqualification dispute recently
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (“U.S. Supreme
Court”). In Williams v. Pennsylvania,13 Williams, a death row inmate
appealing his death sentence, sought the disqualification of Chief
Justice Castille of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (“PA Supreme
Court”) based upon Castille’s prior involvement as the District Attorney
who supervised the prosecutor that secured Williams’s conviction and
death sentence.14 Chief Justice Castille also supervised the attorneys who
handled the initial appeals from those judgments against Williams.15
Williams argued because of the nature of his claims, which were based
largely on prosecutorial misconduct by lawyers serving under District
Attorney Castille, the jurist was probably biased or at least would appear to
be biased in the case.16 In addition, Williams called Castille’s impartiality
into question because Castille’s own pronouncements of his stance in
favor of the death penalty during his judicial campaign evidenced an
apparent or probable bias.17 Thus, Williams argued given the jurist’s prior
conduct,18 Castille should be disqualified under both Pennsylvania law
based on an “appearance of bias” standard19 and under the federal
13. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
14. Id. at 1903 (questioning “whether the justice’s denial of the recusal motion and his
subsequent judicial participation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
15. Respondent’s Motion to Recuse Chief Justice Castille at 2, Commonwealth v. Williams,
105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014) (No. 163 EM) (“Chief Justice Castille was the District Attorney throughout
the trial, capital sentencing, post-trial, and direct appeal proceedings in this case.”).
16. See id. at 7 (stating there is requirement of no actual basis, yet “there must not be ‘even the
probability of unfairness’” for a justice to be exercised within the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
17. See id. at 3–4 (listing examples of statements made by Castille during his campaign for the
PA Supreme Court).
18. In the state court proceeding, Williams also argued Chief Justice Castille’s prior statements
in other death penalty cases, which questioned the tactics, motives, and ethics of Williams’s legal
defense team, from the Federal Community Defender Office (FCDO), provided another basis to
disqualify the jurist. Id. at 5. However, for reasons not explained in any of the court pleadings
(presumably a strategic decision by the appellate lawyers), Williams did not pursue this additional
theory of disqualification when the case was at the U.S. Supreme Court. See generally Petitioners Brief
for Writ of Certiorari, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 15-5040) (June 12,
2015); see also Brief for Petitioner, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (No. 15-5040) (Nov. 30,
2015).
19. Respondent’s Motion to Recuse Chief Justice Castille at 11, Commonwealth v. Williams,
105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014) (No. 163 EM) (“Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
identifies the following as an example of when a judge’s ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned’

248

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 7:238

Due Process Clause standard, which relies on the higher “probability of
bias” standard articulated in Caperton.20
A. Justice Castille Refuses to Recuse
The defense team timely raised his concerns about
Chief Justice Castille’s participation in Terry Williams’s case by filing the
motion for disqualification immediately after the appeal was docketed in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.21 In that motion, Williams requested
Chief Justice Castille recuse himself, and asked that the entire PA Supreme
Court review the matter if Chief Justice Castille denied the request.22
Chief Justice Castille denied both requests.23 Even though Williams’s life
hung in the balance, Chief Justice Castille refused to recuse himself
without denying a single factual allegation upon which Williams’s request
for relief was based or addressing how the facts should be analyzed under
the Pennsylvania recusal rule or the federal Due Process Clause.24
and, thus, when his or her recusal is required – when the judge ‘served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy’.”); see also Joseph v. Scranton Times, 987 A.2d 633, 634 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam)
(requiring recusal where circumstances or factors “that may reasonably question the jurist’s
impartiality in the matter . . . [require] no need to find actual prejudice, but rather, the appearance of
prejudice is sufficient to warrant the grant of new proceedings,” and stressing a “judge should not
only avoid impropriety but must also avoid the appearance of impropriety”).
20. Respondent’s Motion to Recuse Chief Justice Castille at 7, Commonwealth v. Williams,
105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014) (No. 163 EM) (“As the United States Supreme Court most recently stated
in Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009): ‘Under our precedents there are objective standards
that require recusal when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is
too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”‘“ (quoting Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868
(2009))).
21. The appeal was docketed on September 28, 2012, and the disqualification motion was filed
a few days later. See Respondent’s Motion to Recuse Chief Justice Castille at 17, Commonwealth v.
Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014) (No. 163 EM) (showing the Certificate of Service was hand
delivered to the District Attorney’s Office on Oct. 1, 2012). The motion to recuse makes clear that
Mr. Williams’s lawyers sought recusal of Justice Castille in other death penalty cases on similar
grounds and those requests were repeatedly denied. See id. at 5–6 (detailing other cases where recusal
was denied in similar situations).
22. Id. at 16 (“For the reasons stated, Respondent respectfully prays: 1. that Chief Justice
Castille recuse himself; 2. that, should Chief Justice Castille decline to recuse himself, this motion be
referred to the full Court for decision; and that the full Court direct Chief Justice Castille’s recusal.”).
23. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016)
(No. 15-5040) (outlining Justice Castille’s orders); see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-5040
(Sup. Ct. 2015), Order of Chief Justice Castille Denying Motion to Recuse (Oct. 1, 2012) (Joint
Appendix I, 171a).
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016)
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The prosecutors who opposed Justice Castille’s recusal suggested the
brevity of the denial was due to the time constraints imposed by Williams’s
pending execution, which was set for just a few days later.25 However,
Chief Justice Castille himself offered no such explanation and never
otherwise explained his decision to not step aside, even though he wrote a
lengthy concurring opinion on the merits.26 Instead, his concurrence
focused solely on what Chief Justice Castille deemed to be the abuses of
the post-conviction review court and Williams’s defense team.27 The
decision reads, in both substance and tone, like other disqualification
decisions by the challenged jurist in high-profile cases—penned by a
person lacking sufficient self-awareness or lacking any awareness of how
their own conduct is viewed by others.
The concurrence was
Chief Justice Castille’s death penalty “swan song,” as he retired soon after
his concurring opinion was docketed.28

(No. 15-5040) (“Chief Justice Castille issued a one-sentence order on the motion . . . .”). In fact,
Chief Justice Castille denied the recusal motion in a single sentence order: “AND NOW, this 1st day
of October, 2012, Respondent’s Motion for Recusal is DENIED, as is the request for referral to the
full Court.” Id.; see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-5040 (Sup. Ct. 2015), Order of
Chief Justice Castille Denying Motion to Recuse (Oct. 1, 2012) (Joint Appendix I, 171a).
25. Brief of Respondent at 22 n.5, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 155040) (referencing the petitioners brief which stated the petitioner repeatedly asserted “Castille
‘provided no explanation’ for his recusal decision” and also indicating there was no time to file an
opinion in the circumstances of the case because the execution was scheduled for two days later).
26. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234, 1245 (Pa. 2014) (Castille, J., concurring) (limiting
his concurrence to his thoughts on the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)).
27. See id. (“I write separately . . . to address the important responsibilities of the [PostConviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)] trial courts in serial capital PCRA matters, an issue brought into
stark relief by the extraordinary, and unauthorized, measures undertaken by the PCRA court in this
case.”). Chief Justice Castille also found the PRCRA court “lost sight of its role as a neutral judicial
officer” when it ordered the production of the prosecutor’s entire file to determine whether the Brady
standards for disclosure of exculpatory evidence were violated. Id. In addition, Chief Justice Castille
labeled Williams’s latest request for relief from his death sentence as “frivolous” and criticized
Williams’s defense team for an “obstructionist, anti-death penalty agenda.” Id.
28. Chief Justice Castille, whose role is the focus of the appeal, was involved in both the
deliberation and voting that resulted in the PA Supreme Court reversing the lower court’s ruling and
reinstating Williams’s death sentence. However, following that ruling on December 15, 2014, Castille
resigned from the bench as required by the state’s mandatory retirement rules for the PA Supreme
Court based on age restrictions. Soon thereafter, Williams’s defense team filed motions seeking reargument and reconsideration, which were denied without any explanation by the PA Supreme
Court.
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B. Lingering Doubts About Disqualification
Chief Justice Castille’s refusal to recuse himself without stating reasons,
as well as the PA Supreme Court’s refusal to review Castille’s decision,
garnered plenty of attention in the Keystone State, and created doubts
about the impartiality of Chief Justice Castille and the entire high court of
Pennsylvania.29 This unrest may have impacted the decision for the U.S.
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and resolve the disqualification dispute
in Williams.30 As with Caperton31 and other high-profile recusal cases, it is
likely there will be a lingering dissatisfaction with the results of Williams
because the same substantive standards under the Due Process Clause
were applied, although the underlying presumption regarding impartiality
was not adequately addressed or explained by either the majority or the
dissent.
The U.S. Supreme Court did take some advantage of the opportunity
presented in Williams and held Chief Justice Castille and all jurists—
whether acting alone or as part of a multi-member panel—to a higher
ethical standard. The Williams case once again shined a bright spotlight
29. See Lincoln Caplan, A Flagrant Conflict of Interest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:01 PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/a-flagrant-conflict-of-interest/ (opining Castille’s
refusal to recuse himself “underscored his obtuseness about what basic fairness requires” and further
reporting the court’s opinion in the case will be tainted because of the circumstances of the case); see
also Mary Claire Dale, Despite Ties, PA Chief Justice Stays on Death Case, TIMES HERALD (Oct. 2, 2012,
8:04 AM), http://www.timesherald.com/article/JR/20121002/NEWS03/121009923 (discussing
Williams’s lawyers attempt to have Justice Castille disqualified because of his previous involvement as
a prosecutor in Williams’s case); Andrew Keck, Pa. Death Penalty System Denies Due Process, LEHIGH
VALLEY LIVE (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:29 AM) www.lehighvalleylive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/03/
pa_death_penalty_system_denies.html (“The number of overturned death sentences in Pennsylvania
is astronomical and unacceptable.”); John L. Micek, A Supreme Screw-up. Ex-Justice Castille Never Should
Have Heard Death Penalty Case He Prosecuted, PENN LIVE (Mar. 2, 2016, 8:29 PM)
www.pennlive.com/opinion/2016/03/a_supreme_screw-up_pa_death_pe.html (“Everyone deserves
a fair and unbiased shake before the court . . . Castille should have known better. That he didn’t just
strikes another blow to Pennsylvanians’ shattered confidence in their highest court.”).
30. See Dorothy Samuels, Ethics 101: The Same Person Cannot Serve as Prosecutor and Judge in the Same
Case. The Supreme Court Needs to Say So., HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2016, 12:34 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dorothy-samuels/ethics-101-williams-v-pennsylvania_b_9318126.
html (“[T]he current case turns on a transcending principle at the core of the nation’s justice system
and the rule of law, one that should not be controversial—namely, the right to a fair hearing before
an impartial judge.”).
31. Caperton outlined two instances where recusal would be required for due process, one where
the judge had a financial interest in the case, and the other where the judge has actual basis or when
the facts create a “probability of bias.” See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877–90
(2009) (outlining the types of cases where judicial recusal is required).
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not just on the actions of Chief Justice Castille and the PA Supreme Court,
but also upon the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.32 A majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices agreed that “[u]nder the [federal] Due Process
Clause there is an impermissible [and unconstitutional] risk of actual bias
when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor
in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case.”33 The Williams Court
did not find that Chief Justice Castille was actually biased, but similar to
the Caperton opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the objective
nature of the judicial bias inquiry.34 The Williams majority also rejected
the argument that a jurist’s constitutionally impermissible bias could be
deemed “harmless error” if the jurist’s vote is not dispositive to the multimember panel decision.35 Rather, the Williams majority suggested that the
actually or probably biased jurist’s vote may not be dispositive because the
challenged jurist was successful in influencing other panel members’
votes.36
While the Williams decision creates a new, albeit narrow basis for
disqualification under the federal Due Process Clause, it was disappointing
that the opinion was not unanimous given the facts of the case and the
number and quality of amicus briefs filed in support of petitioner
(including a group of former judges with prosecutorial experience).
However, in light of the recent recusal record of the Court,37 it was
disheartening to learn that the U.S. Supreme Court remains divided over
disqualification. Nevertheless, this is not surprising because the Williams
case presented the same tension between the strong presumption of
impartiality and a weaker presumption based upon new cognitive
psychology discoveries about the realities of judging, which were presented
but unresolved in Caperton.38 So, we see the same Justices dissenting in
32. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court, In Recusal Case, May Find Itself Looking Inward, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/politics/supreme-court-in-recusal-casemay-find-itself-looking-inward.html? (discussing disqualification dispute in Williams and suggesting
that outcome of that case will impact practices of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court).
33. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1901 (2016).
34. Id. at 1905.
35. Id. at 1910 (stating if “the objective risk of actual bias on the part of a judge rises to an
unconstitutional level, the failure to recuse cannot be deemed harmless”).
36. Id. at 1909 (“The fact that the interested judge’s vote was not dispositive may mean only
that the judge was successful in persuading most members of the court to accept his or her position.
That outcome does not lessen the unfairness to the affected party.”).
37. See supra, notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
38. Tigran W. Eldred, Faculty Blog: The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Williams v. Pennsylvania,
NEW ENG. L. REV. (June 20, 2016) https://newenglrev.com/2016/06/20/faculty-blog-the-
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Williams who dissented in Caperton.39 In fact, the dissent by Chief Justice
Roberts in Williams relied upon the same narrow interpretation of earlier
recusal precedents and a very strong presumption of judicial impartiality to
which he gave voice in his Caperton dissent.40
Just as with Caperton41 and other high-profile recusal cases, it is likely
there will be a lingering dissatisfaction with the Williams decision.
Although the substantive standards under the federal Due Process Clause
were applied in a way that protected the litigant’s right to a fair trial in that
case, the underlying presumption regarding judicial impartiality was
inadequately addressed by both the majority and the dissent. Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court remains divided over how strong the presumption
of judicial impartiality should be given to “psychological tendencies and
human weaknesses” of the average jurist.42 Thus, the bench, bar, litigants,
and the public are left wondering how to strike the proper balance
between the presumption of impartiality and the reality of jurists laboring
under a bias blind spot.
Given the manner in which the most high-profile disqualification
decisions appear to be handled in state and federal courts, including the
use of procedures permitting the challenged jurist to make the
psychology-of-conflicts-of-interest-in-williams-v-pennsylvania/ (“[T]he [Williams] decision stands out
as yet another example [like Caperton] of how the [Supreme] Court continues to make proclamations
about the nature of human psychology and decision-making without identifying the scientific source
for its conclusions.”).
39. Compare Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting with Alito J. joining), and id.
at 1914 (Thomas, J. dissenting), with Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting with Scalia, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J. joining).
40. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion rests on
proverb rather than precedent. This Court has held that there is ‘a presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators.’”) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975))).
Justice Thomas filed a solo dissent in which he argues Williams’s criminal case and his postconviction proceedings constitute two separate and distinct cases so no recusal is needed even under
the test applied by the majority. Id. at 1917 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, that dissent also
relied, in part, upon a strong presumption of judicial impartiality. Id. (“The biases of judges ‘cannot
be challenged,’ according to Blackstone, ‘[f]or the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour
in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends
upon that presumption and idea.’”(citation omitted)).
41. See supra, note 31.
42. Accord Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting with Alito J. joining) (“This
Court has held that there is ‘a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators.’”); Id. at 1906 (Kennedy, J.) (“There is, furthermore, a risk that the judge ‘would be so
psychologically wedded’ to his or her previous position as a prosecutor that the judge ‘would
consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position.’”).

2017]

Reforming Recusal Rules

253

disqualification decision, it isn’t surprising that public confidence in the
judiciary has been negatively impacted.43 This impact is apparent from
recent surveys showing that public confidence in the highest federal
courts44 and state judiciary is waning when it comes to resolving
important legal questions fairly.45 Thus, the Williams decision is an initial
step in a longer journey to restore public confidence in the judiciary. The
next step is for the federal and state courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, to fully examine and satisfactorily explain the proper role of the
presumption of judicial impartiality taking into account our current
understanding of cognitive psychology, the bias blind spot, and the
importance of judicial impartiality.
C. The Importance of Judicial Impartiality
The legitimacy of the judicial branch depends more heavily on public
confidence in the institution because, unlike the other two branches of
government, the courts have “no influence over either the sword or the
purse.”46 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
importance of public confidence in maintaining the authority of the

43. John Wihbey, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion and Decision-Making: Research Roundup,
www.journalistresource.org/studies/politics/polarization/researchJOURNALIST’S RESOURCE,
roundup-supreme-court-public-opinion (last updated June 28, 2013) (“Many legal scholars noted that
the Court’s standing with the public . . . [has decreased] as 2012 polling data suggested that the
Court’s traditionally high approval ratings had declined considerably.”).
44. See Confidence in Institutions: Trends in Americans’ Attitudes Toward Government, Media, and
http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/
Business,
ASSOCIATED PRESS
confidence-in-institutions-trends-in-americans-attitudes-toward-government-media-andbusiness0310-2333.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2016) (reiterating America’s confidence in the Supreme
Court is at an all-time low); see also Justin McCarthy, Americans Losing Confidence in All Branches of U.S.
Gov’t, GALLUP (June 30, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171992/americans-losing-confidencebranches-gov.aspx (showing the Supreme Court has reached record lows in American’s confidence).
45. See GBA Strategies, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Public%20Trust%20and%20
Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx (indicating the biggest threat to public confidence
in the state court judiciary is the public’s concern about judicial bias); see also James P. Wenzel et. al.,
The Sources of Public Confidence in State Courts: Experience and Institutions, 31 AM. POL. RES. 191, 194–95
(2003), http://www.lsu.edu/faculty/bratton/7963/wenzel.pdf (hypothesizing the public’s
confidence in state courts is affected by the method by which judges attain their positions).
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in
appearance, from political entanglements . . . .”).
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judiciary in America’s democracy.47 In fact, the requirement of an
impartial judiciary has “been jealously guarded”48 by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The U.S. Supreme Court regularly reiterates the importance of
impartiality in our judicial system: “It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’”49
This mandate of fairness means not only that the procedures used in the
trial must be impartial, but also the decisionmaker must not be biased for
or against a party, or have prejudged the case.50 The requirement of
judicial impartiality is designed to produce just results in individual cases,
as well as to promote public confidence in the justice system.51 The
public must be confident the judiciary is a legitimate institution to secure
widespread compliance with court rulings, especially those that are
unfavorable with a significant part of the citizenry.52 The judiciary creates
public confidence in the legitimacy of the institution in a number of ways,
47. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (declaring the need to preserve “both
the appearance and reality of fairness, which ‘generat[es] the feeling, so important to popular
government, that justice has been done’ . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his
interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the
arbiter is not predisposed to find against him”) (citations omitted)); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955) (finding an impartial judge is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of court
proceedings in upholding due process).
48. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242.
49. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
50. Generally, the term “impartial” means “favoring no one side or party more than another;
without prejudice or bias.” Impartial, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD C. DICTIONARY (2010). The ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct defines impartial as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or
against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering
issues that may come before a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2011).
51. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (declaring “[f]airness of course requires an absence of
actual bias in the trial of cases[,]” and “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness”); see also Barry P. McDonald, Supreme Court Justices: Are They Supposed to Be
Politicians in Black Robes?, CNN, www.cnn.com/2016/10/27/opinions/supreme-court-role-shouldntbe-political-mcdonald/index.html (last updated Oct. 27, 2016 5:49 PM) (suggesting when judges base
cases on political preferences “the American public loses confidence in the court as a place where any
person can get a fair hearing based on the merits of their legal claims” and hypothesizing public
support can be retained if “the court exercise[s] that judgment impartially on behalf of all
Americans”).
52. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 375, 79–80 (2006) [hereinafter Psychological Perspectives] (explaining legitimate actors and
institutions can more effectively shape the behavior of citizens without using rewards or threats, and
law-related actors and institutions are legitimized through the use of fair procedures).
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including the use of fair procedures.53 When people evaluate the
procedural fairness of institutions, like the courts, they are influenced by
“evidence of even-handedness, and objectivity in decision-making. . . .”54
In other words, impartiality is a key component of how people assess the
procedural fairness and, in turn, the legitimacy of the judiciary.55
D. New Lows in Public Confidence in the Judiciary
Unfortunately, public trust and confidence in the judiciary has waned in
recent years. In the most recent Gallup national poll on trust in
government, just 53% of Americans surveyed indicated they have a “great
deal” or “fair amount” of trust and confidence in the federal judiciary.56
In fact, recent polls reflect public confidence in the federal judiciary (as
well as the other two branches of the federal government) is on a
downward trend57 and some polls show that public confidence in the
judiciary has fallen to historic lows.58
The waning confidence in governments and the courts is not unique to
the federal system. Some of the same national surveys show public
confidence in state governments handling local problems is not particularly
high.59 In addition, nearly a third of the American public is similarly
53. See Tom. R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 317 (2003) (“Procedural justice matters when people are making general evaluations of the
police or court by expressing their degree of trust and confidence.”).
54. Id. at 298.
55. See id. (“People think that decisions are being more fairly made when authorities are neutral
and unbiased and make their decisions using objective indicators, not their personal views.”).
56. Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New Low of 53%, GALLUP (Sept. 18,
2015) http://www.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-judical-branch-sinks-new-low.aspx (determining
the drop in public approval is the lowest it has ever been and hypothesizing the drop is due to the
“way things are going in the country”); see also Trust in Government, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2016) (providing 12%
of respondents have a “great deal” of trust and confidence in the federal judiciary and 49% of
respondents indicating “a fair amount” of satisfaction with the judiciary, but 28% and 9% indicating
“not very much” trust and confidence or “none at all” in the most recent poll).
57. Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support for the Courts:
Survey Results, 95 GEO. L. REV 899, 900 (2007) (proclaiming two representative national surveys of
American adults found only 64% of the public say it trusts the U.S. Supreme Court which is 11%
lower only one year later).
58. Justin McCarthy, supra note 44 (echoing polled Americans have the lowest confidence in the
U.S. Supreme Court since 1973, the first year confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court was
documented).
59. Trust in Government, supra note 56 (noting 62% of respondents have a “great deal” or “fair
amount” of trust and confidence in their state government compared to 71% confidence in the local
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unsure about the ability of state courts to handle cases fairly.60 The
public’s confidence is especially low when campaign contributors appear
before the jurists who they helped elect, with 76% of Americans61
believing that money influences outcomes in cases.62 Even a greater
number of voters, nearly 81%, voice concerns about impartiality when
they are told that in some states nearly half of all cases heard by the highest
state courts involve cases affecting the interests of campaign
contributors.63 The public’s concerns with judicial impartiality are not
limited to the influence of money but also extend to the impact of a jurist’s
personal political ideology as well.64 Moreover, even jurists themselves are
less sanguine about the impartiality and independence of an increasingly
politicized judiciary.65 In recent years, jurists themselves have begun to
express doubts about the ability of the average judge to remain impartial
with 26% of judges admitting campaign contributions have at least some
influence on decisions they make.66 In addition, some of the nation’s top
government).
60. Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 57, at 900 (commenting only 62% of the public say they
trust their respective state courts to make decisions to the benefit of the state as a whole).
61. This number comes from samples of voters including both Democrats and Republicans.
Memorandum from Stan Greenberg, Chairman and CEO, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research &
Linda A. DiVall, President, Am. Viewpoint, to Geri Palast, Exec. Dir., Justice at Stake Campaign
(Feb. 14, 2002), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/PollingsummaryFINAL_9EDA3EB3B
EA78.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Greenberg & DiVall to Palast].
62. See id. (summarizing findings of a national survey of 1000 Americans registered to vote and
concluding voters are concerned about how money and special interests effect court rulings).
63. See id. (indicating 81% of voters and 74 % of judges in some states are concerned that nearly
half of all state supreme court cases “involve someone who has given money to one or more of the
judges hearing the case”).
64. See Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Do Supreme Court Justices Have a Right to Comment on
Politics, CONST. DAILY (July 13, 2016), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/07/constitutioncheck-do-supreme-court-justices-have-a-right-to-comment-on-politics/
(emphasizing
although
Americans believe they have a right to hold strong views concerning politics, those same people
“seem to be squeamish about having judges do the same”); see also Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note
57, at 900 (reporting six out of ten Americans believe judges “are legislating from the bench rather
than interpreting the law”).
65. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y
TIMES (Oct 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0 (noting sitting judges are beginning to question the current campaign finance system, and
quoting a current (at the time of the article) Ohio Supreme Court justice who feels like people “mean
to be buying a vote” when they contribute to his campaigns).
66. See Memorandum from Greenberg & DiVall to Palast, supra note 61 (surveying 2,428 state
court justices—including 188 state Supreme Court justices, 527 appellate court judges, and 1,713
lower court judges—regarding their views of judicial impartiality and independence with regard to
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jurists have called for reforms in recusal rules to ensure an impartial
judiciary in the face of increasing pressures from campaign contributors,
especially in highly politicized judicial races.67 These jurists have good
reasons to be concerned. As reflected in a number of recent studies, there
is a significant correlation between campaign donations and judge’s votes
in cases involving those supporters’ interests, including at the highest state
courts.68 Thus, especially as our judicial branch becomes more political, it
is not just the public who is concerned about the impartiality of the
judiciary, jurists themselves are having doubts.
III. HISTORY OF RULES, RESISTANCE, AND REFORM
A. History of Recusal Rules
1. Civil, Canonical, and Other Ancient Laws
Some older judicial systems—including early Jewish law,69 Christian
canonical law,70 and Roman civil law71—permitted parties to petition for
the disqualification of jurists based upon a broad range of grounds,
including a mere suspicion or appearance of bias. This more expansive
view of disqualification was grounded in “the salutary doctrine that the
campaign contributions).
67. See generally Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J. at A18
(Sept. 27, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115931733674775033.
68. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis
of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 99–100 (2011) (finding elected
judges are more likely to decide in favor of the business interests that support their campaign and the
likelihood increases as the amount of the campaign contributions increases); see also Adam Liptak &
Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/01judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) (highlighting a
study of the Ohio Supreme Court, where there were 215 cases with “direct potential conflicts of
interest, justices recused themselves just 9 times,” and noting “[o]n average, [the Ohio Supreme
Court Justices] voted in favor of contributors 70 percent of the time”).
69. See, e.g., RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, § 1.2 at 5 , n1 & 2 (2d ed., 2007) (hereinafter “RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES”) (“Every judge who judges a case with complete fairness, even for
a single hour is credited by the Torah as though he had become a partner to the Holy One . . . in the
work of creation.” (citing Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbath 10a (n.d.) quoted in 1 EMANUEL
QUINT & NEIL HECHT, JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1980) and The Code of Maimonides, Bk XIV,
ch 23, 68-70 (translated by A. Herschman 1949)).
70. See Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1 (1923) (explaining the origins of
recusal in our judicial system lies within canonical law).
71. See id. at 3 (“[T]his [right of litigants to disqualify a jurist based upon a suspicion of bias] is
set forth in the Codex of Justinian, with admirable emphasis.”).
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personal attitude of the judge toward the litigant, or toward the cause itself
shall be above all suspicion.”72 The Roman law gives a clear example of
the litigant’s right to request recusal when bias is suspected:
It is the clearest right under general provisions laid down from thy exalted
seat, that before hearings litigants may recuse judges. A judge being so
recused, the parties have to resort to chosen arbitrators, before whom they
assert their rights.
Although a judge has been appointed by imperial power yet because it is
our pleasure that all litigations shall proceed without suspicion, let it be
permitted to him, who thinks the judge under suspicion to recuse him
before the issue be joined, so that cause go to another . . . .73

In other words, there was no strong presumption of impartiality based
upon the mere fact that the decisionmaker held judicial office. Rather,
these ancient and more generous recusal rules appear to reflect that judges,
being human, are not immune to bias.74
2. English Law
While there is some evidence the early English courts recognized a
litigant’s right to recuse a jurist for a broad range of reasons,75 this was not
true at the time the legal system was established in the Pre-Revolution
American colonies.76 Instead, when our nation was founded, English
common law—unlike the Roman civil law and religious laws—severely
limited the grounds for disqualification of judges:

72. Id.
73. See id. at 3 n. 10 (translating CODEX OF JUSTINIAN, lib. III, tit. I, No. 16); see also FRED H.
BLUME, ANNOTATED JUSTINIAN CODE 18–19 (Timothy Kearley ed., 2d ed. 2009), available at
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/book-3pdf/book%203-1.pdf.
74. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671,
699 (2011) [hereinafter Why Judicial Disqualification Matters] (discussing the fact that, objectively
speaking, judges are prone to bias because of natural human psychology, but that disqualification
decisions still depend, in part, upon the presumption of judicial impartiality).
75. See 4 HENRY BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETDINBUS ANGLIEA 281 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans., BRACTON President and Fellows of Harvard College ed., 1942) (suggesting a common
law judge should recuse when he is related to a party, hostile to a party, or has been counsel in a
case).
76. RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, § 1.4, at 10–11 (detailing the
creation and evolution of the American legal system).
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By the laws of England also, in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might
be refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that
judges or justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that
presumption and idea.77

Blackstone went on to observe that if this strong presumption of
impartiality proved to be wrong, then the judge could be impeached or
otherwise held “accountable for his conduct.”78
While the reasons for recusal by an English common law jurist were
quite limited, at least two grounds for disqualification did exist.79 First, a
jurist was disqualified and could not preside over a case in which he had a
direct pecuniary or propriety interest.80
Second, as stated by
Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham’s Case:81 “quiaaliquis non debet
esse Judex in propria causa” or “no man shall be a judge in his own cause.”82
As illustrated in Dr. Bonham’s Case, the second principle meant even an
77. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (University
of Chicago eds. 1979) (1768), available at https://books.google.com/books?id=YiZOAAAAcAAJ&
printsec=frontcover&dq=blackstone+commentaries+volume+3&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjZ
9JCXh7jRAhXJ44MKHTLMBZEQ6AEIIzAB#v=onepage&q=%22Bracton%20and%20Fleta%22
&f=false.
78. Id.
79. Many courts and commentators have described these disqualifying grounds as one standard,
direct or indirect pecuniary interest, rather than two standards. See, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927) (holding an individual was denied due process by trial because the judge had a pecuniary
interest in the case); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 868 (2009) (holding an
appellate court judge should have recused himself when the CEO of a company before him
contributed approximately $3million to the judge’s campaign); Why Judicial Disqualification Matters,
supra note 74, at 690–94 (discussing the current appearance-based approach to recusal). However, a
careful reading of Dr. Bonham’s Case suggests that prior to Lord Coke’s pronouncement in that case
an indirect pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case was not disqualifying. In addition, Lord
Coke’s opinion in Dr. Bonham’s Case lays the groundwork for a further expansion of the grounds for
disqualification by noting the partiality problem was exacerbated by the conflicting roles of judge and
prosecutor played by the challenged jurist. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 646 (K.B. 1609).
80. GRANT R. HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS 12–13
(2009) (explaining that the “best known authorities for [this] proposition are Sir Nicholas Bacon’s
Case . . . and the Earl of Derby’s Case . . . ”(citations omitted)).
81. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1609).
82. Id. at 652 (“The censors cannot be judges, ministers and parties; judges . . . give sentence or
judgment; ministers . . . make summons; and parties . . . have moiety [in half] of the forfeiture,
because no person may be a judge in his own cause . . . and one cannot be judge and attorney for any
of the parties.”).
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indirect financial interest could be disqualifying so long as the interest or
conflict was not too remote.83 Otherwise, an English common law jurist
could not be challenged on any ground, not even based upon a close
family tie or friendship with a party, and certainly not for suspicion of
bias.84
These narrow grounds for disqualification did not mean that impartiality
was unimportant under English common law; rather, the jurist’s
impartiality was presumed. As reflected in Blackstone’s own words, this
presumption of impartiality was vital to the proper functioning of the
judiciary in the English common law system: “For the law will not suppose
a possibility of bias or favour in a judge who is already sworn to administer
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that
presumption and idea.” 85
Blackstone was not alone in this view. In fact, other commentators,
including Sir Matthew Hale, held similar views about the centrality of this
presumption of impartiality to the judicial role and identity.86 Given this
strong presumption of impartiality and the concept of judicial identity
underlying it, “[t]o challenge a [common law] judge for bias was, in effect,
to accuse him of abdicating his role—an accusation the common law
courts simply would not tolerate.”87
This narrow right of litigants to recuse English common law jurists
based upon only two distinct grounds was not and is not the rule in most
civil law countries.88 Louisiana, the one state to have always operated
83. See HAMMOND, supra note 79, at 12–13 (explaining the judge in Dr. Bonham’s Case had an
indirect interest in the case because the judge received a fine he had the power and authority to levy).
84. Id. (explaining Brookes v. Rivers held bias is not to be presumed, and therefore, the
Chamberlin of Chester was not disqualified from hearing a case in which his brother-in-law was a
party (citing Brookes v. Rivers, 1 Hard 503; 145 ER 569 (K.B. 1668))); see also RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, § 1.2, at 6 (“[T]he refusal of early English [common
law] courts to recognize bias as basis for disqualification extended even to cases involving familial
relationships between judges and parties.”).
85. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at 361.
86. See 2 LORD J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 207–09
(James Cockcroft & Co. eds. 1881) (quoting Sir Matthew Hale’s “Things Necessary to be Continually
Had in Remembrance” which sets forth eighteen standards for conduct of a common law judge, at
least seven of which direct jurists to remain impartial).
87. Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74, at 679.
88. RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, § 1.2, at 5–6 (citing
Comment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 U.S.C. Section 455, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 538, 538–39 n.5 (1973) which emphasizes the formation of sweeping disqualification statutes in
common law jurisdictions).
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under a civil code, recognizes a broad right of recusal.89 However, the
common law jurisdictions—including the United States and the United
Kingdom—have long upheld a more restrictive view of recusal based
upon a stronger presumption of impartiality.90 This difference between
the civil code and common law jurisdictions has been attributed to the
differing roles that jurists played in both legal systems.91 Specifically,
common law judges did not act as fact finders as their civil law
counterparts did; thus, the grounds for recusal were believed to be
properly more narrow in common law jurisdictions.92
In addition, there is reason to believe that the conflicting views of
judicial disqualification within common law countries reflects the
differences of the roles played by jurists in courts of law and courts of
equity, as well as certain technical requirements observed in those
courts.93 In the English courts of law, where the strong presumption of
impartiality held sway, the legal claims and defenses were required to meet
very technical pleading and proof requirements and relief could only be
granted in legally prescribed forms.94 This type of proceeding, naturally,
lent itself to a more mechanical view of judging and created less risk of a
jurist’s bias affecting the outcome. In contrast, the forms of pleading,
proof and relief in equitable cases heard by English chancery courts were
less circumscribed, and led to the exercise of greater discretion by the
jurist.95 Understandably, the recusal rules governing chancery court were
broader and included disqualification for suspicion or appearance of
bias.96 Thus, the different roles of jurists in courts of law and courts of
89. Putnam, supra note 70, at 8 (explaining how Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction that has long
recognized a more expansive right of disqualification, including recusal based upon financial and
other interests, relationship with any litigant, or prior involvement in the case as an attorney or
judge.).
90. See HAMMOND, supra note 80, at 11–14 (tracing the history of recusal rules in the British
Commonwealth and United States).
91. See generally Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74 (discussing the roles of judges in
both common law and civil code jurisdictions).
92. See id. at 678–79 (noting even jurors in common law jurisdictions, who were the fact-finders
in the proceedings, were subject to removal for a much broader range of reasons, including suspicion
of bias).
93. These differences include the technical requirements for pleading and proving claims and
the relief that could be granted in courts of law and courts of equity.
94. See generally GARRY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (11th ed.
2010) (inferring the technicality of the procedures gave little room for bias).
95. See id. at 6–7 (contrasting the procedures of courts of law and courts of equity and the
discretion of the jurists in each type of court).
96. See Putnam, supra note 70, at 4–7 (describing the differences between the narrow
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equity help explain the differing recusal rules in England at the time of the
founding of our nation.
However, since that time, distinctions between the English common law
and canonical courts have disappeared and a unified standard for judicial
recusal has emerged in England.97 This new unified standard relies less
upon the ancient presumption of impartiality and now permits
disqualification based upon apparent bias.98 Likewise, in the United
States, all federal and most state court jurists may grant legal and equitable
relief in a single proceeding.99 Thus, in light of the merger of jurist’s role
in granting relief under both law and equity, it is time to reexamine
American recusal rules, including our continuing reliance on the strong
presumption of impartiality that underlies much of our disqualification
jurisprudence.
3. A “Vicious Cycle” of Refusal, Reform, Resistance, and Repeat
While the original disqualification standards in both England and the
United States relied heavily upon the strong presumption of partiality, it
was not long before new situations in both legal systems would challenge
the soundness of that strong presumption of impartiality favored by the
common law. In England, the erosion of the presumption began with
some early common law court cases in which the jurist had a very close
relationship to one of the parties, and the change was accelerated by the
dissolution of the separate canonical courts and fusion of the common law
and equity courts into a single court system.100 In the United States, the
initial disqualification standard, like the original English common law
standard on which it was based, was quite narrow: “A [jurist] would be
disqualification rules in English common law courts and English ecclesiastical courts).
97. See HAMMOND, supra note 80, at 11–14 (describing evolution of English recusal standards
and procedures from ancient times to present day).
98. See id. (illustrating the change in the English legal system has effected the standards of
recusal).
99. See Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States Courts, 6 N.C. L. REV.
283, 284 (1928) (“The [U.S.] Congress did not, as no doubt it might have done, create separate
national courts of equity and law, but organized only one system of courts in which might be tried
cases at law, and cases in equity, according as the same judge happened to be playing the role of
common law judge, or of chancellor.”); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970)
(“Separable claims may be tried separately . . . or legal and equitable issues may be handled in the
same trial.”).
100. See HAMMOND, supra note 80, at 11–14 (analyzing the changes regarding the presumption
of impartially of English standards and procedures from ancient times to present day).
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disqualified for possessing a direct financial interest in the cause before
him, and for absolutely nothing else.”101
However, early in the nineteenth century the standards for
disqualification were enlarged to include a jurist’s relationship to a party
litigant.102 The broadening of disqualification standards continued with a
significant overhaul of the Federal Disqualification Statute in 1911.103
For the first time in America, this statute permitted parties to challenge a
jurist on grounds of bias without requiring the challenger to demonstrate
that actual bias existed.104 This preemptory challenge mechanism was the
first step in weakening the nearly ironclad presumption of impartiality,
which erosion has continued in fits and starts to this day.
A variety of factors have been used to explain the expansion of
reformed recusal rules. Some commentators have postulated that the
single most important factor in expanding grounds for judicial
disqualification in the United States was the increasing politicization of the
judiciary which upset the balance between judicial independence and
judicial accountability.105 The shift was most dramatic in the states, many
of which changed their judicial selection processes from appointments to
elections in hopes of creating more accountability to the citizens.106
Similar changes in disqualification practice were taking place in the federal
judicial system, where all jurists are appointed.107
101. Richard E. Flamm, History and Problems with Federal Judiciary Disqualification Framework,
58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 753 (2010) (citing Edward G. Burg, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial
Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1480–81 (1981) and noting American judicial disqualification
jurisprudence emerged from this English base).
102. Flamm, supra note 101, at 754 (discussing the amendment of the judicial disqualification to
include “relationship to a party as an additional ground for judicial disqualification”).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000) (creating new standards by amending the prior statute).
104. See Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74, at 680–81 (describing recusal reform
efforts in United States dating back as early as 1792 when Congress passed the first statute that
included additional grounds for disqualification beyond what the early common law provided and
continuing through today); see also Flamm, supra note 101, at 754 n.21 (describing the statute
promulgating a procedure for “compelling a judge to enter the existence of his conflict of interest on
the record and prescribing disqualification where the judge was a material witness”).
105. See Gabriel D. Serbulea, Comment, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for
Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1114–20 (2011) (elaborating on the shift in balance between judicial
independence and accountability created by state judicial elections, and federal and state legislative
responses that included new bases for disqualification).
106. See id. at 1114 (“This state of affairs favored judicial independence from the electorate.
That changed dramatically when Jacksonian-style Democracy swept the states-starting with
Mississippi in 1832-bringing about statewide judicial elections.”).
107. See id. at 1118 (“Although the 1792 version of the federal statute required disqualification
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These changes in the federal judiciary could be explained by the impact
of the shift in the state courts and to a lesser extent what was taking place
in England.108 Others have suggested the expansion of disqualification
grounds reflects an “evolution in thinking” about judges, judging, and the
judiciary.109 Another theory suggests the changes in disqualification may
mirror “a shift in society’s view of judicial psychology, and of psychology
in general: from the eighteenth century’s economic man, susceptible only
to the tug of financial interest, to today’s Freudian person, awash in a sea
of conscious and unconscious motives.”110
Whatever the cause, there is little doubt the strong presumption of
impartiality began to deteriorate as the grounds for judicial disqualification
steadily increased in response to new problems or perceived problems
with judicial impartiality. As new situations occurred, it became clear the
very limited common law grounds for disqualification—direct or indirect
pecuniary interest—were insufficient to insure judicial impartiality. Thus,
there is a history in America of adopting new recusal rules, which is
coupled with resistance by the judiciary that stymies full implementation of
the recusal reforms, thereby setting the stage for the next crisis in
confidence.
Changes in judicial recusal rules were often made in response to drops
in public confidence arising from the most controversial cases:
With each new scandal or crisis has come a flurry of scholarship advocating
an expansion of the grounds for disqualification, and Congress has often
responded by amending the recusal laws as suggested. However, altering the
substance of the recusal standard has proven to be an ineffective method of
reforming this sensitive area of judicial self-governance. . . . [H]istory shows
that each time the standard for recusal is broadened by Congress, it is
narrowed soon thereafter as members of the judiciary apply it to themselves.
The very self-dealing that makes recusals necessary in the first place has

[of Article III judges] only for interest, for acting in the matter, or for having been of counsel in the
case, Congress subsequently amended the statute and added new disqualification bases . . . .”).
108. See id. at 1118–19 (reiterating how the issues in the states were influencing the federal
courts).
109. RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, § 1.4, at 8, n. 6.
110. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 247
(1987).
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operated to prevent disqualification statutes from being employed as fully
and broadly as Congress intended.111

This “vicious cycle” of new rules, resistance, reforms, and repeat can be
traced throughout the history of American disqualification
jurisprudence.112 The pattern of change may reflect underlying tensions
between the desire for jurists to be independent and the desire to hold
jurists accountable in an increasingly political world.113 The pattern may
also reflect changes in our understanding of human psychology and our
beliefs about how judges make their decisions.114 Whatever the
underlying reasons, there can be no doubt the history of recusal rules
reflects a tug-of-war between the judiciary on one hand, and the legal
community and general public on the other hand, over what it means to be
a judge and how central the presumption of impartiality is to that role.115
Moreover, although the substantive standards and procedures are
varied, the backdrop of recusal rules in current use embody a strong
consensus among the bench, bar, and general public that jurists actually
need to be impartial, and often to appear to be impartial.116 In fact, the
very existence of an appearance-based regime reflects this strong
commitment to impartiality.117 However, the current appearance-based
recusal regime is in trouble because the judiciary, the larger legal
establishment, and the public do not agree on “when . . . [the general]
presumption of [judicial] impartiality [should] yield to the suspicion that

111. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U.
KAN. L. REV. 531, 533–34 (2005).
112. See Leubsdorf, supra note 110, at 245 (describing the “crisis of disqualification” occurring
in America dealing with disqualification).
113. See Serbulea, supra note 105, at 1114–20 (discussing the challenges an elected judge faces
against a public that is dissatisfied with the judge’s decisions).
114. See Leubsdorf, supra note 110, at 244 (exploring ways in which a judge may justify her
actions).
115. Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74, at 676 (“Ultimately, then, recent interest
in disqualification rules is emblematic of a larger struggle within the legal establishment over how
best to preserve the legitimacy of the judiciary itself, at a time when our collective understanding of
what properly influences judicial decision-making, and what perverts it, is unclear.”).
116. See id. at 686–90 (explaining the trend in recusal rules where judges must avoid even the
appearance of bias). See generally RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE supra note 69,
(discussing current recusal standards).
117. Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74, at 686–90 (discussing the appearancebased standard and emphasizing its importance to its supporters).
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extralegal influences may have compromised the judge’s impartial
judgment.”118
4. The Formalists and Realists Split Over the Presumption of
Impartiality
This lack of consensus on the proper strength of the presumption of
impartiality likely stems from differing understandings of (1) what judicial
conduct constitutes “impartiality” or “partiality” in specific cases, and
(2) the proper amount of evidence needed to overcome the presumption
of impartiality. There is some consensus about when jurists are likely to be
partial and those instances are codified in the conflict of interest
provisions of disqualification statutes and judicial ethics codes, which
include per se rules that serve as a sort of laundry list of situations in which
partiality is presumed.119 In addition, there have been some extreme cases
of conflicts of interest or bias not covered by the enumerated exceptions
that many in the bench, bar, and public believe called into question the
jurist’s impartiality.120 Yet beyond those enumerated instances of
118. Id.
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2012) (mandating a federal jurist shall disqualify himself in the
certain circumstances). The following are the circumstances when a federal jurist shall disqualify
himself:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as
counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
Id.
120. The amicus briefs filed before the U.S. Supreme Court in Caperton, including one brief for
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recognized partiality and extreme cases of actual, probable, or apparent
bias, there is little agreement on the substantive standards for recusal.121
This disagreement over substantive standards for disqualification is
premised, at least in part, upon differing views of the proper strength of
the presumption of impartiality. Not surprisingly, the split in support for a
stronger or weaker presumption of judicial impartiality mirrors a larger
divide within the legal community between formalists and legal realists.122
twenty-seven former state Supreme Court Justices, supported disqualification of the challenged jurist
who received substantial campaign support from the CEO of a party litigant that eventually appeared
before the Supreme Court of West Virginia. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and
Justices in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08–
22), 2009 WL 45979; Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08–22), 2009
WL 27299; Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08–22), 2009 WL 45974; Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08–
22), 2009 WL 45978; Brief of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, Amicus Curiae,
Supporting Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08–22),
2009 WL 815213; Brief of American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08–22), 2009 WL 45971; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868 (2009) (No. 08–22), 2009 WL 45975. Also, public opinion was skewed heavily in favor of
disqualification as evidenced by a plethora of news stories. See Dahlia Lithwick, Cash Bar, SLATE
(Mar. 3, 2009, 8:31 PM) http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_
dispatches/2009/03/cash_bar.html (discussing the judge’s actions in a negative light); see also Adam
Liptak, The Worst Courts for Businesses? It’s a Matter of Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2007)
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/us/24bar.html (reviewing the failure of Justice Benjamin to
recuse himself and suggesting that West Virginia Supreme Court judicial decisions should be judged
more critically because of it). In addition, at least one statistical study of citizens domiciled within the
state where the challenge arose shared the same consensus with the public. See James L. Gibson &
Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the
Legitimacy of Court?, 74 J. POL. 1, 19 (2012) (finding that both direct contributions and independent
expenditures in judicial campaigns undermined public perceptions of jurists’ fairness). However,
there was a vigorous dissent in Caperton. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009)
(Roberts, J. dissenting). The Supreme Court dissenters did not suggest that the judge was qualified
under the state’s appearance of bias standard; instead they disagreed with the ruling based upon a
belief the probability of bias standard, which the dissent viewed as a variation of an appearance
standard, should not be constitutionalized. See id. at 98–99 (“The need to consider these [forty
enumerated] and countless other questions helps explain why the common law and this Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence have never required disqualification on such vague grounds as
‘probability’ or ‘appearance’ of bias.”).
121. Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74, at 676 (“The net effect is that except in
extreme or well-settled cases, consensus on when it is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a
judge is elusive—we do not know it when we see it.”).
122. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE
OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 30 (2009) (relating the formalist view of judging as a mechanical
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The formalists123 embrace a strong presumption, which supports their
own view of judging as a mechanical or formal application of law to the
facts.124 This formalist approach is also consistent with the belief that
jurists, due to their education, intellect, training, and moral constitution,
are able to overcome any biases—even nonconscious biases—that may
exist.125 Although these strong views of judicial impartiality persist even
in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary, some formalists are open
to the idea that judicial education may “assist judges in recognizing and
combating these common barriers to well-reasoned, objective judgments,
thereby enhancing the actual impartiality of the courts.”126 In contrast,
the legal realists are more willing to accept newer scientific evidence
regarding human cognition and to adapt legal standards to such
realities.127 This shift is reflected more broadly within the law, but also
has impacted theories about judges, judging, and recusal rules.128

application of the facts of a given case to the legal standard).
123. This often includes many jurists applying the recusal standards to themselves or their
brethren.
124. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (the majority and
dissent offer differing views of judging and the proper role of the presumption of judicial
impartiality); see also Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74, at 699 (discussing the
appearance of this “fundamental rift over how deep the presumption of impartiality ought to go” and
describing the Caperton dissenters as subscribing to the traditional or formalist view and the majority,
in contrast, exhibiting realist or scientific inclinations).
125. See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental Value of
Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis”, 99 KY. L. J. 259, 303–11 (2010–2011) (suggesting judicial
education can reinforce the ability of jurists to set aside biases and rule based upon the facts and the
law).
126. Id. at 308 (describing the need for judicial education focused on teaching jurists about the
science of heuristics and other cognitive illusions but failing to discuss how training will affect
nonconscious bias in disqualification decisions, including the bias blind spot).
127. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19 (2008) (positing judicial decisionmaking reflects a combination of nine different theories of judicial behavior—including attitudinal,
strategic, sociological, psychological, economic, organizational, pragmatic, phenomenological, and
legalist); see also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, SO WHAT DOES LAW HAVE TO DO WITH IT? WHAT
JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 1 (2011) (describing legal realism was
inspired in part by principles of behavioral psychology). See generally JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949) (documenting the legal realist view of
judicial decision-making and collecting essays reflecting how law and politics affect judicial decisionmaking).
128. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 110 (discussing recusal rules from a legal realist
perspective).
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In fact, the split between formalists and legal realists is reflected in the
rift between the majority and the dissent in Caperton.129 The formalist
view underlies the dissenter’s opinions and is particularly clear in
Chief Justice Robert’s dissent. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized the “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators” and reminded us “[a]ll judges take an oath to uphold the
Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we [should] trust that they
will live up to this promise.”130 Echoing Blackstone’s concerns about the
need for a strong presumption of impartiality to support judicial
authority,131 Chief Justice Roberts even went so far as to predict the
presumption of impartiality would be threatened by an increase in
disqualification motions that would follow the Caperton decision and bring
“the judge and the judicial system into disrepute.”132
In contrast, the Caperton majority embraced a legal realist perspective on
judging, even hinting at the latest scientific discoveries about the role of
unconscious bias in human cognition.133 In fact, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, explicitly acknowledged the danger of nonconscious bias
by discounting the significance of the challenged jurist’s subjective belief
that he was not actually biased.134 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
also makes clear that the federal due process disqualification standard is an
objective and more scientifically based test:

129. Refocusing Recusals, supra note 10, at 247–50 (outlining the formalist perspective
underpinning the dissenting opinions in Caperton).
130. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 891, 902 (2009) (Roberts, J. dissenting).
131. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at 361 (“For the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or
favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly
depends upon that presumption and idea.”).
132. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 899. However, there is little evidence that Caperton actually did open
the floodgates and cause a significant increase in motions to disqualify. See Adam Liptak et.al.,
Caperton and the Courts: Did the Flood Gates Open? 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 494 (2015)
(recognizing in the five years since the Caperton case was handed down, “it has indeed been rare to
have Caperton motions . . . in part because of the narrowness of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
majority and the fact that lower courts have been unwilling to take a broad, sweeping approach to
Caperton recusals”).
133. Refocusing Recusals, supra note 10, at 247–50 (describing the legal realist perspective
underpinning the majority opinion in Caperton).
134. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 869–70. (“Because the objective standards implementing the
Due Process Clause do not require proof of actual bias, this Court does not question
Justice Benjamin’s subjective findings of impartiality and propriety and need not determine whether
there was actual bias.”).
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[T]he question is whether, “under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness,” the interest [of the judge in question]
“poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.”135

In other words, the Caperton majority embraced a view of judges and
judging that is more in keeping with legal realism than formalist views of
judicial decision-making.136 However, while the Caperton majority
suggested the “extreme” facts of the amount and timing of the campaign
contribution warranted disqualification in the specific case, the Caperton
majority stopped short of declaring a clear due process based
disqualification standard that applies whenever a jurist’s campaign
supporter appears before a court.137 Instead, the Caperton majority invited
states to set more rigorous recusal rules using non-constitutional law
(statutes and ethics rules) tailored to reflect the reality of judicial decisionmaking.138
Unfortunately, since the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Caperton opinion
in 2009, few states have succeeded in taking up the challenge and making
real changes to either the substantive standards or the procedural practices
used in deciding disqualification disputes. There has been little progress in
spite of the fact Caperton was followed by a plethora of scholarly articles
suggesting a variety of substantive and procedural changes.139 Soon after
135. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 869–70 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
136. Unfortunately, the Caperton majority stopped short of fully and finally adopting a legal
realist view of judging when they failed to hold that allowing the challenged jurist to decide their own
disqualification disputes, which is standard procedure in all federal and most state courts, likewise
offends the Due Process Clause. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 33 (explaining how
the combination of cognitive illusions, most notably the bias blind spot, and this “self-judging” of
disqualification disputes creates systemic risk of incorrect decisions and undermines public
confidence and proposing the elimination of “self-judging”).
137. Jeffery W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right
Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LIT. 249, 296–97 (2010) (“[O]bservers should
recognize that Caperton’s tentative and case-specific approach did not go far enough and failed to
enunciate the type of more sweeping due process recusal standard necessary to restore and maintain
confidence in state judiciaries.”).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Charles Geyh et. al., The State of Recusal Reform 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
515 (2015) [hereinafter The State of Recusal Reform] (discussing the ABA’s failed efforts to revise the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct following Caperton and judicial reluctance to embrace some
reforms).
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Caperton, the ABA proposed a modification to the existing rule mandating
disqualification when a party or its counsel made a campaign contribution
to support a jurist’s election140 that would also encompass independent
expenditures.141 However, the ABA later withdrew the proposed
amendment, which would have broadened the disqualification rule based
upon more types of campaign support.142
Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement on when the
federal Due Process Clause demands disqualification, only a handful of
states had made any significant progress in recusal reforms in spite of
increased spending in state judicial elections.143 As of 2015, only
Alabama, Arizona, California, Mississippi, and Utah had adopted a version
of ABA Rule 2.11(a)(4) which sets a bright line test for disqualification
based upon set spending levels.144 Currently, an additional eleven states
have adopted standards that contain no specific spending level triggers but
are loosely modeled on the standard discussed in Caperton.145 In addition,
even after Caperton, two states—Nevada and Wisconsin—have outright
140. In 1999, the ABA amended Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the “ABA
Judicial Code”) to require disqualification in connection with direct campaign contributions, which
standard was retained as Rule 2.11(a)(4) when the ABA Judicial Code was revised in 2007. That rule
provides:
The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law
firm of a party’s lawyer has within the previous [insert number] year[s] made aggregate
contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater than $[insert amount] for an
individual or $[insert amount] for an entity [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an
entity].
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, r. 2.11(a)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
141. See The State of Recusal Reform, supra note 139, at 520–22 (“Caperton was decided in 2009, and
beginning in 2010, the ABA tried mightily to pick up the gauntlet laid down by the [U.S.] Supreme
Court in Caperton and modify the current ethics rules in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
regarding judicial elections.”).
142. See id. (“In absence of support [from the ABA Judicial Division and the Conference of
State Supreme Court Chief Justices], the decision was made to withdraw the proposal.”).
143. See id. at 519 (“[Since Caperton, t]here have been some efforts in [the states to reform
recusal standards], and the ABA has been trying for several years. But part of the reason it is hard is
because judges understandably take their jobs seriously; they believe themselves to be impartial.”).
144. See Cynthia Gray, Judicial Disqualification Based on Campaign Contributions, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS. 1, 2–4, http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/files/pdf/topics/center for judicial ethics/
disqualificationcontributions.ashx (last updated Nov. 2016) (listing the five states adopting ABA
Rule 2.11(a)(4)).
145. See id. at 4–9 (describing the rules adopted by the state supreme courts in Arkansas,
Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Washington).
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rejected proposals to adopt disqualification rules based upon campaign
spending.146 Furthermore, while some recusal reforms have been
proposed in Congress—including bills that would require the U.S.
Supreme Court to adopt a code of ethics—those efforts have not been
successful either.147 Thus, the state of recusal practice across the country
remains relatively unchanged since Caperton.
IV. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON IMPARTIALITY
While there has been little reform as of late, even reforms that made are
often not fully implemented by the judiciary. In fact, there is a vicious
cycle of resistance, reform, and repeat with no change, due in part to
jurists’ skeptical attitudes about their own partiality, which in turn creates
doubt in their minds about the real need for recusal reform.148 This
cynicism is supported, at least in part, by how most jurists have been
trained: they are taught impartiality is an important judicial value, but it
must also be coupled with avoiding even the appearance of partiality. In
other words, impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are a core part
of what it means to be a “good” judge.149 Thus, it is understandable that
many jurists are reluctant to accept the possibility that they, like the rest of
us, harbor nonconscious biases because to be open to that possibility
requires jurists question whether they are doing their job correctly by
remaining impartial.
This is not to say that all jurists are unwilling to accept that they may, at
least in some circumstances, be less than entirely impartial. In fact, we all
are willing to accept that such biases exist and these biases could, at least
theoretically, affect our decision-making.150 We also are willing to
146. See id. at 11–12 (detailing the basis of the rejection and the actions taken by those state
supreme courts).
147. See generally Supreme Court Ethics Act, S. 1072, 114th Cong. (2015); Supreme Court Ethics
Act, H.R. 1943, 114th Cong. (2015); Supreme Court Ethics Act, S. 1424, 113th Cong. (2013);
Supreme Court Ethics Act, H.R. 2902, 113th Cong. (2013).
148. See Leubsdorf, supra note 110, at 245 (describing the history of recusal reform as “a vicious
cycle” of resistance, reform, and repeat).
149. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 493
(2013) [hereinafter The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality] (characterizing impartiality as “a standard of
good conduct core to a judge’s self-definition”).
150. See Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self
Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783–84 (2004) (explaining individuals may not notice when
“judgmental failings” influence their own rationality, although they readily accept their “decisions are
tainted by bias” in some situations).
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acknowledge in certain past circumstances, we may have unintentionally
shown some bias.151 But generally, we are unwilling or unable to admit
“succumbing to [such biases] in any particular assessment we are currently
making (or else, of course, we would change that assessment until we felt
that it was in accord with reality).”152 Thus, it stands to reason that
jurists, like the rest of us, are aware of the impact of bias on human
decision-making and may even, acknowledge that their past decisions may
reflect some bias. Yet a jurist still may not fully embrace the need for
recusal reform, and their nonconscious bias may impact disqualification
and other decisions, thereby undermining the goal of impartial judging.
While jurists may be unwilling or unable to appreciate the impact of bias
on their decisions, it does not necessarily mean any jurist who disagrees
with a proposal to reshape recusal rules is intentionally impeding recusal
reform efforts. On the contrary, some opposition to recusal reform may
simply reflect that the jurist has an honest disagreement about how to
achieve the goal of protecting judicial impartiality and balancing litigants’
rights to a fair trial. In fact, some jurists have been an important voice in
the debate over recusal reform. For example, current and former jurists
have written scholarly articles regarding recusal reforms;153 the
Conference of Chief Justices has filed amicus briefs in important federal
and state cases regarding recusal reforms;154 and jurists have worked
151. See id. (noting individuals are inclined to believe they “have been guilty of particular biases”
in the past, but “are innocent of bias” after introspective justification).
152. Id.
153. See Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 779,
798 (2015) (discussing recusal reform at the U.S. Supreme Court level and opining “judges
understand and respect the importance of recusal decisions”); see also McKoski, supra note 125,
at 303–11 (supporting a strong presumption of impartiality, and suggesting jurists are able to set
biases aside due to their education, intellect, and inculcation within the traditions of the judiciary);
Albert Tate, Jr., The Propriety of Off-Bench Judicial Writing or Speaking on Legal or Quasi-Legal Issues, 3 J.
LEGAL PROF. 17, 19 (1978) (exploring whether a judge’s right to express opinions regarding law
reform may conflict with his or her appearance of impartiality).
154. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (discussing the Conference
of Chief Justices’ position that various state codes of judicial conduct prevent campaign misconduct
and promote confidence in elected judicial officials (citation omitted)); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Conference of Chief Justices in Support of Respondent at 5, Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct.
1656 (2015) (No. 13-1499) (“A judge whose appearance of impartiality is compromised undermines
the public’s confidence in the judiciary as a whole, and imperils public respect for its judgments.”);
Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of Chief Justices in Support of Respondents at 12–13,
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521) (arguing recusal reform by
itself is insufficient and must be augmented by additional safeguards to guarantee impartial jurists
(citation omitted)). Notably, the Conference of Chief Justices did not file an amicus brief in the
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within the ABA, state bar committees, and various courts’ rules
committees to suggest or secure adoption of recusal reforms.155 All of
these efforts have advanced the conversation about the proper next steps
in recusal reform, but these individual jurists’ efforts have not interrupted
the vicious cycle.
While some jurists are taking an active role in recusal reform, there are
still not enough jurists seeking meaningful reform. It is disappointing how
few jurists openly acknowledge the impact of nonconscious biases
(particularly the bias blind spot) on disqualification decisions. In fact,
much of what jurists have contributed to the conversation appears to be
colored by their perception of their own and other jurists’ presumptive
impartiality.156 Some jurists believe they are unfair “targets” of
disqualification motions—with some jurists acting as if it is an affront for
an attorney to file, much less vigorously pursue, a disqualification
motion.157 Sadly, there are even examples of jurists finding lawyers in
appeal of Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016). Williams involved a death row inmate who
successfully challenged the refusal of the Chief Justice of the PA Supreme Court to recuse himself
from the inmate’s appeal. See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2016) (vacating and
remanding the PA Supreme Court’s judgment). The U.S. Supreme Court concluded the state
supreme court justice created “an unconstitutional risk of bias” when he refused to recuse himself
despite previously serving as the district attorney who approved the “decision to seek the death
penalty,” and supervised the prosecutors accused of engaging in prosecutorial misconduct during the
inmate’s criminal trial and appeals. See id. at 1907 (providing the procedural posture and background
facts of the appeal).
155. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 8: URGING ADOPTION OF
PROCEDURES FOR DECIDING JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL MOTIONS: ENSURING A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL PROCESS (2014), available at http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/
Files/CCJ/Resolutions/01292014-Urging-Adoption-Procedures-Deciding-Judicial-DisqualificationRecusal-Motions.ashx (adopting a resolution that emphasizes the need to establish an effective
standard for whether a judge should be recused).
156. See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, at 7 (2011), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011yearendreport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 YEAR-END REPORT] (discussing recusal standards and applicability
of judicial ethics codes to the U.S. Supreme Court). Chief Justice Roberts stated:
I have complete confidence in the capability of my colleagues to determine when recusal is
warranted. They are jurists of exceptional integrity and experience whose character and fitness
have been examined through a rigorous appointment and confirmation process. I know that
they each give careful consideration to any recusal questions that arise in the course of their
judicial duties. We are all deeply committed to the common interest in preserving the Court’s
vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law.
Id. at 10.
157. See Neumann, supra note 5, at 392 (“The case law is filled with descriptions of defensive
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contempt for protecting their client’s interests, retaliating against parties
that seek to disqualify the jurist, and reporting lawyers to the state bar
discipline authorities for conduct connected with the disqualification
motion.158 Of course, these egregious examples are the exception.
However, these instances of improper reactions to disqualification
motions tell an important part of the story of judicial resistance to recusal
reform.
Based upon the history of disqualification practice in both federal and
state courts, including the vicious cycle of recusal reform, there is little
doubt that jurists have not openly embraced recusal reform. In fact, this
doubtful (and some would say disdainful) attitude of some members of
judiciary—including members of the U.S. Supreme Court—reflects the
resistance that has characterized past attempts to reform recusal rules.159
and angry judges denying motions that they recuse themselves.”). Recusal motions may stir
resentment throughout the judicial community since disqualification challenges the very essence of a
jurist’s duty:
Perhaps human nature causes judges to view disqualification motions as a challenge to their
personal integrity. Certainly, no judge, and arguably no person, enjoys being told that he or she
is, or appears to be, unfair. It is understandable, therefore, that some (perhaps, many) judges
take umbrage at the filing of disqualification motions. . . . Judges may be offended by the
allegations that they believe challenge their good name and reputation. They may view the
motion as suggesting that they lack the most essential characteristic of good judging—the ability
to judge a case impartially.
But judges must battle these natural instincts to consider the motions as personal attacks or
criticisms and instead reflect on the underlying purpose for judicial disqualification motions—to
preserve public trust and confidence in the judiciary.
Penny J. White, A New Perspective on Judicial Disqualification: An Antidote to the Effects of the Decisions in
White and Citizens United, 46 IND. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (2013) (citations omitted).
158. See Matthew Mosk & Brian Ross, ‘Circus’ Continues? Judge Goes After a Lawyer Who Challenged
Her Over Controversial Jet Deal, ABC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:45 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/
US/circus-continues-judge-lawyer-challenged-controversial-jet-deal/story?id=28886937 (“[I]n her
first response to a recusal motion, Davis turned on one of the attorneys, accusing him of leveling a
‘false and misleading assertion’ against her. She [then] referred the matter to the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel for investigation, a move that took legal ethics experts by surprise.”); see also In
re Cohen, 99 So.3d 926, 940 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam) (reprimanding a trial judge for unnecessarily
creating a hostile atmosphere when he threatened to report counsel to the state bar because counsel
filed motion to disqualify). In the same opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida also made clear
“[a]ttorneys should not be placed in a position where they fear retaliation for filing a motion to
disqualify.” Id.
159. See, e.g., Flamm, supra note 101, at 761 (“During the first half of the nineteenth century,
one judge noted that in some districts, lawyers who wanted to try to disqualify a federal judge were
‘advised to write out their motion to disqualify on the back of their license to practice law.’” (Citation
omitted)).
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Instead, many members of the judiciary appear to believe little or no
recusal reform is needed, or the only proper reform is to make the
litigant’s ability to challenge a jurist more, not less, restrictive.160 Jurists’
reluctance to support reform of substantive and procedural recusal rules is
based in part on a conscious choice to adhere to the tradition of a strong
presumption of judicial impartiality.161 However, that support for a
strong, and in some cases nearly irrebuttable, presumption of impartiality
does not properly reflect new social science discoveries regarding
nonconscious biases and their effects on human cognition and decisionmaking.
A. The Psychology of Decision-making
1. Cognitive Illusions and Judicial Decision-making
In addition to jurists’ conscious skepticism of the need for recusal
reform, “the very nature of human cognition” can induce judges to “make
consistent and predictable mistakes in” certain situations.162 The human
decision-making feature most responsible for these systematic mistakes
relies on the use of heuristics—mental shortcuts that are used to quickly
solve complex problems.163 The use of heuristics often leads to good
results; however, sometimes those mental shortcuts lead to inaccurate
inferences that create flawed judgments.164 These cognitive illusions
systematically impact decisions made by jurors and lawyers, as well as
160. Cf. McKoski, supra note 125, at 295–96 (urging courts to reform recusal rules and eliminate
the standard based on appearance of bias by adopting the higher “actual bias” test for
disqualification).
161. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 891 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(stating “[a]ll judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we
trust that they will live up to this promise”). Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, also
questioned whether a “judge get[s] to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased, or
[whether] his reputation [is] solely in the hands of the parties to the case[.]” See id. at 898 (providing a
list of forty questions “courts will now have to determine” regarding judicial bias as a result of the
majority’s opinion).
162. Chris Guthrie et. al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001)
[hereinafter Inside the Judicial Mind] (reporting on studies that demonstrate jurists are just as likely to
be affected by a number of cognitive illusions as the ordinary public).
163. Id.
164. Chris Guthrie et. al., Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision-Making,
86 JUDICATURE, July–Aug. 2002, at 44, 50 (explaining the use of heuristics in judicial decisionmaking and demonstrating jurists are affected by cognitive illusions at nearly the same rate as
laypersons).
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other professionals in non-legal settings.165 Recent studies have tested the
impact of various cognitive illusions on jurists’ decision-making, and it is
clear that jurists suffer from the same cognitive illusions as the rest of
us.166 Thus, we need to understand and account for the impact of
cognitive illusions, especially the bias blind spot, on jurists’ disqualification
decisions.
2. Bias Blind Spot and Disqualification Decisions
Recent social science discoveries have shown that a number of cognitive
illusions affect judicial decision-making. For example, one well-known
social science study demonstrated that judges, like the rest of us, are prone
to a number of cognitive illusions that affect judicial decision-making,
including anchoring, framing effects, hindsight bias, representativeness
heuristics, and egocentric biases.167 “These [cognitive] illusions are
among the most well documented in the psychological literature on
judgment and choice and they have been shown to affect litigants, lawyers,
and the legal system as a whole.”168 Many of these cognitive illusions
operate on a nonconscious level; therefore jurists are unaware of the
impact on their decision-making.169 Thus, even a well-intentioned jurist
may be impacted by these cognitive illusions and, in some cases, could be
unaware of the bias created.
Likewise, a number of studies have clearly demonstrated the existence
of another cognitive illusion known as the “bias blind spot,” which creates
a particularly troubling form of nonconscious bias. The bias blind spot
causes all of us to underestimate our own susceptibility to bias and the
impact those biases have on our decisions and at the same time
overestimate the likelihood of others’ biases.170 In other words, the bias

165. See id. (noting heuristics also affects doctors, accountants, engineers, and military leaders).
166. See Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 162, at 784 (recording study results finding jurists to
be affected by all five cognitive illusions tested for—anchoring effects, framing effects, hindsight
bias, representativeness heuristic, and egocentric bias—and showing less vulnerability than laypersons
and other experts in only two of the five illusions).
167. See id. (testing for these five illusions and concluding they do affect judges and their
decision-making).
168. Id. at 787.
169. See Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 39 (2006) (discussing the roots of the bias blind spot, including nonconscious
biases and the use of introspection, which focuses on conscious thoughts).
170. See id. at 41 (investigating the effects of individual perceptions on bias and prejudice and
discussing the sources of that bias).
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blind spot is a sort of “metabias—a bias in the recognition of other
biases—that systematically biases judgment and behavior in unique and
predictable ways.”171 While there is no scientific study specifically
demonstrating jurists also are susceptible to the bias blind spot, there is no
reason to believe jurists are immune from this particular cognitive illusion,
especially since we know they are affected by many other nonconscious
biases.172 In fact, when individual jurists’ disqualification decisions or
positions on recusal reform are evaluated, there are sound reasons to
believe that the bias blind spot causes jurists to make questionable
disqualification decisions.173
The important effect of the bias blind spot on disqualification decisions
is that this metabias can result in a jurist who is actually, probably, or
apparently biased remaining on the case, and impacting the litigant’s rights
and also the public’s confidence in the judiciary. Thus, when evaluating
judicial disqualification practices, the impact of the bias blind spot should
be taken seriously.
B. Impartiality and Bias Blind Spot
The potential impact of a biased jurist on a litigant’s rights has long
been recognized: “It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process.’”174 This mandate of fairness means
the procedures used in the trial must be impartial, and also the
decisionmaker must not be actually or probably biased for or against a
party or have prejudged the case.175 Otherwise, the jurists’ participation
171. Irene Scopelliti et. al., Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences, 61 MGMT. SCI.
2468, 2469–70 (2015), available at http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2096.
172. See John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The
Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2010) (collecting studies of implicit bias and
discussing the impact on judicial decision-making); see also See Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 162,
at 784–87 (describing studies demonstrating the impact five specific cognitive illusions have on
litigants, lawyers, and the legal system as a whole).
173. See, e.g., Refocusing Recusals, supra note 10, at 275–78 (discussing how the bias blind spot
colored a state supreme court justice’s perception of his own biases and makes it more likely
disqualification decisions will be biased when made by the challenged jurist); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to the Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 48 (2010) (finding some state supreme court justice’s failure to recuse was an
egregious error that likely impacted the decision on the merits).
174. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
175. See id. at 874 (holding a litigant’s due process rights are violated when the probability of

2017]

Reforming Recusal Rules

279

violates a litigant’s due process rights and can negatively affect the litigant’s
other legal rights.176 The impact on litigants’ legal rights may be
immediate and direct when an actually or probably biased jurist takes part
in the decision-making.177 Although sometimes the impact on the
outcome is hard to prove, there should be little doubt there is an effect.178
Thus, if a jurist presides over a case and is actually or probably biased, it is
likely the litigant’s rights and the outcome of the case will be affected.
The requirement of judicial impartiality is designed to produce just
results in individual cases and to promote public confidence in the justice
system.179 Even if the evidence rises only to the level of an appearance of
bias, this can have a harmful impact on the public’s confidence in the jurist
and the judiciary as a whole.180 The public must be confident in the
judiciary as a legitimate institution to secure widespread compliance with
court rulings, especially those that are unfavorable with a significant part of
the citizenry.181 The legitimacy of the judicial branch depends more
heavily on public confidence in the institution, because unlike the other
two branches of government, the courts have “no influence over either the
sword or the purse . . . .”182 When people evaluate the procedural fairness
of institutions, like the courts, they are “especially influenced by evidence

bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, and requiring an objective assessment of the facts be
made in deciding disqualification disputes).
176. Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger
Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and
Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 765 (2011) (discussing the impact of a biased decision-maker
on litigants’ legal rights).
177. See id. at 798, 805 (considering the impact of a biased decisionmaker and the
ineffectiveness of appellate review using a deferential review standard).
178. See id. at 753–59 (examining the difficulties in sorting out the impact of a biased
decisionmaker and the ineffectiveness of appellate review using a deferential review standard).
179. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (declaring “[f]airness of course requires an
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases” and “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness”).
180. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886 (stating due process requirements for judicial recusal are only
a bare minimum standard and inviting legislators and jurists to adopt higher standards, including an
appearance of bias standard, to maintain public confidence in the judiciary).
181. See Psychological Perspectives, supra note 52, at 375 (explaining public compliance of the law is
shaped by the fair use of procedures and trustworthiness even if the public is not in agreement with
the decision).
182. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1974); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction.”).
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of even-handedness, factuality, and the lack of bias or favoritism
(neutrality).”183 In other words, impartiality is a key component of how
people assess the procedural fairness and the legitimacy of the judiciary.
This explains why the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
importance of public confidence to maintaining the authority of the
judiciary in our democracy and has “jealously guarded” the need for
judicial impartiality.184 Thus, even jurists who may not harbor actual bias
must sometimes step aside to ensure public confidence in the judicial
system.
The lack of public confidence in the outcome when there are reasonable
questions about the jurist’s impartiality is exacerbated by the bias blind
spot, which causes us all to perceive others’ biases more negatively than we
perceive our own biases. This difference in perceptions of bias leads to a
disconnect between the views about impartiality held by the challenged
jurist on the one hand, and the litigants and the public on the other hand.
The existence and effect of the bias blind spot, which has been proved in
repeated scientific studies,185 calls into question the strong presumption
of impartiality upon which much of our disqualification jurisprudence is
based. For example, a recent study found that only one adult out of 661
admitted to being more biased than the next average adult.186 Therefore,
183. Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and Authorities, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 416, 422 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
184. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (declaring the need to preserve “both
the appearance and reality of fairness,” which “‘generat[es] the feeling, so important to popular
government, that justice has been done’ . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his
interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the
arbiter is not predisposed to find against him”) (internal citation omitted); see also In re Murchison,
349 U.S at 136 (finding an impartial judge is necessary to maintain the legitimacy of court
proceedings).
185. See Emily Pronin et. al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others,
28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 378 (2002) (analyzing bias blind spot perceptions
when evaluating one’s own bias versus the bias perceived in others); see also Joyce Ehrlinger et. al.,
Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 2 (2005) (suggesting self-enhancement motivation and naïve realist cognitive
illusions as among the reasons we rely upon introspection when evaluating our own bias).
186. Scopelliti et. al, supra note 171, at 2473, 2475. The study comprised of fourteen specific
biases which is said to compose a participant’s bias blind spot score on a scale that ranged from -7
to 7. Id. at 2475. A score greater than zero indicated a bias blind spot. Id. “At the individual level, a
large majority (85.2%) of participants exhibited a significant Bias Blind Spot across the [fourteen]
items, with the averages of their scores being marginally or significantly greater than [zero] . . . . Only
one participant (0.1%) had an average Bias Blind Spot score that was significantly lower than [zero].”
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the strong presumption of impartiality—which undergirds the
Blackstonian ideal of a jurist capable of overcoming any biases due to his
intellect, education, and experience—must be reexamined in light of the
latest social science discoveries.
Although social scientists continue to document the impact of the bias
blind spot and other cognitive illusions on human decision-making, there
is no evidence to support the assumption jurists are less prone to the
impacts of the bias blind spot. First, a few empirical studies demonstrate
that jurists are subject to a variety of other cognitive biases at rates similar
to non-jurists.187 Second, none of the cognitive or social psychology
studies performed to date have challenged the existence and effects of the
bias blind spot.188 Third, there is no scientific evidence to support the
belief more intelligent persons are less prone to the bias blind spot.189
Lastly, the existing evidence supports the contrary conclusion: those who
are more intelligent are more likely to falsely believe they can overcome
this cognitive illusion.190
Thus, the conviction—no matter how
genuine—that jurists are capable of making unbiased decisions about their
own biases is not supported by and is, in fact, contradicted by the scientific
evidence.
The scientific evidence suggests there is absolutely no reason to believe
that jurists are immune from the bias blind spot and, on the contrary,
jurists may be more susceptible because they believe they do not suffer
from the cognitive illusion. The latest social science experiments reflect
Id. “This susceptibility to the Bias Blind Spot appears to be pervasive, and is unrelated to people’s
intelligence, self-esteem, and actual ability to make unbiased judgments and decisions.” Shilo Rea,
Researchers Find Everyone Has a Blind Spot: Believing You’re Less Biased Than Your Peers Has Detrimental
Consequences, CMU (June 8, 2015), http://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2015/june/biasblind-spot.html.
187. See Chris Guthrie et. al., supra note 164, at 45 n.4 (demonstrating judges are just as likely to
be affected by a number of cognitive illusions as the ordinary public).
188. See generally Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a Balanced Social Psychology:
Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition, 27 BEHAV.
& BRAIN SCI. 313 (2004) (reviewing the literature on a variety of cognitive illusions and noting no
studies that seriously question the existence of the bias blind spot).
189. See Richard F. West & Russell J. Meserve, Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate Bias
Blind Spot, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 515 (2012) (indicating the lack of scientific
studies testing whether superior intellect may ameliorate the effects of the bias blind spot on certain
cognitive functions).
190. See id. (finding the bias blind spot effect is “unmitigated by increases in intelligence [and
this result is] consistent with the idea that the mechanisms that cause the bias are quite fundamental
and not easily controlled strategically [because the cognitive mechanisms at work are] evolutionarily
and computationally basic”).
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that the bias blind spot is “independent of intelligence and personality
traits related to self-esteem, self-enhancement, and self-presentation.”191
Also, those studies demonstrate the bias blind spot is not dependent on
our competency to make decisions either.192 Instead, it appears that “the
belief that one is less biased than one’s peers appears to reflect a biased
perception of the self rather than a more general inferior [decision-making]
ability, or an accurate reflection of one’s superior judgment and decisionmaking ability.”193 In other words, the less biased we believe we are, the
more likely we are suffering from the bias blind spot but simply are unable
to see it. In addition, the belief that one is less likely to be affected by bias
makes it more likely bias will affect decision-making, and less likely the
person will be impacted by advice from others and training to reduce the
bias.194 Also, this view of judicial impartiality also reflects how cognitive
illusions—specifically the bias blind spot—have shaped not only individual
disqualification decisions but the debate surrounding recusal reform.195
Thus, litigants, the public, and the judiciary should be more concerned
about impartiality when a jurist downplays the role of bias in their
decision-making or otherwise exhibits a lack of understanding of the
effects of the bias blind spot.
V. SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES PROTECTING
IMPARTIALITY
To understand the impact of the bias blind spot on disqualification
decisions, we must comprehend both the substantive standards and
procedural process currently relied upon in the federal and state court
systems to help protect a litigant’s due process rights and maintain public
confidence in judicial impartiality.

191. Scopelliti et. al, supra note 171, at 2468.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Refocusing Recusals, supra note 10, at 303–04 (discussing how jurists’ bias blind spot
colors their perceptions of judicial bias and makes recusal reform more difficult).
195. See id. at 265–300 (examining the Caperton case and how the bias blind spot affected three
judges’ perception of their own bias in that case).
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A. Overview of Current Federal and State Substantive Standards for
Disqualification
The substantive standards used by all federal courts, as well as most
state courts, require the challenged jurist to use an objective test to
determine if sufficient concerns regarding impartiality exist to warrant
disqualification. These substantive standards are drawn from three types
of legal sources: (1) the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution and similar provisions of some state constitutions;
(2) applicable federal and state statutes on disqualification; and (3) the
relevant federal and state judicial ethics codes.196 Each of these sources
of law provides for one of three standards for disqualification: the
challenged jurist is disqualified when he is actually, probably, or apparently
biased.197 The federal Due Process Clause relies upon the probability of
bias standard but also mandates disqualification for actual bias.198 The
state constitutions that address disqualification are, by and large, based
upon an actual bias standard.199 Generally, the federal and state statutory
laws and judicial ethics codes include two types of tests: (1) a list of per se
disqualifying conditions; and (2) a general disqualification standard that is
invoked when the facts do not fit within one of the enumerated per se rules
but the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.200 However,
all of these standards for disqualification based upon judicial bias require
consideration of the circumstances from the perspective of the reasonable,
informed person—an “other” rather than from the “self” oriented
perspective of the challenged jurist.201 Thus, current federal and state
substantive law applicable to disqualification decisions requires the

196. See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 181, 189–91 (2011) (discussing sources of judicial disqualification standards); see also Serbulea,
supra note 105, at 1151–73 (surveying the recusal laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia
in the Appendix).
197. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 820 (summarizing the various substantive
standards for disqualification under federal and state constitutions, statutes, and judicial codes of
conduct).
198. See id. at 822–24 (discussing actual and probability of bias standards embedded within the
Due Process Clause).
199. See Serbulea, supra note 105, at 1119 (“In the majority of jurisdictions there is no
constitutional ground to disqualify a judge, unless one is implicitly read in the right to fair trial, and
even then it would require actual bias, not merely its appearance.”).
200. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 827–34 (considering the objective nature of
the federal and state substantive standards for disqualification).
201. Id. at 834–35.
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decisionmaker to evaluate the evidence of actual, probable, or apparent
bias as an objective third party would assess the allegations of partiality.
1. Federal Court Substantive Standards for Disqualification
In its most recent pronouncement on the proper standard of proof for
judicial disqualification under the federal Due Process Clause, the U.S.
Supreme Court elucidated a test mandating disqualification when “the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too
high to be constitutionally tolerable.”202 Applying this general standard,
the Caperton majority held the state supreme court jurist was disqualified
from hearing a matter “when a person with a personal stake in a particular
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge
on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign
when the case was pending or imminent.”203 It is clear from both the
language and the holding in Caperton that the “probability of actual bias”
standard requires an objective evaluation of the external evidence of bias
to comply with the Due Process Clause.204 In fact, Caperton explicitly
states the disqualification determination does not depend on the
challenged jurist’s assessment of his own thoughts, opinions, or feelings,
but relies on external evidence of how the average jurist would respond in
the circumstances: “[W]hether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented.’”205 The probability of bias
standard examines the likelihood of actual bias but relies upon objective
and external evidence of bias rather than introspection, which is
subjective.206 Thus, the Due Process Clause standard is not focused on
202. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
203. Id. at 884.
204. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 822–24 (explaining the three different ways
that the Caperton majority made clear the due process standard of disqualifications requires an
objective assessment of possible bias).
205. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883–84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). In the
facts before the Caperton Court, “[t]he inquiry center[ed] on the contribution’s relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the
election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.” Id. at 884.
206. See Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause,
42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 66 (2010) (arguing Caperton “rejected the well-established appearancesbased recusal standard in favor of a probability-based [standard] that examines the likelihood of
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the internal evidence of actual bias (especially any “facts” known only to
the challenged jurist), but mandates an objective assessment of the
probability of judicial bias made from the perspective of a reasonable third
party.
In the federal courts, a disqualification motion may also be based upon
statutory law, specifically 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, or 455.207 However,
Section 455 governs most federal disqualification disputes in practice.208
This is true because of the limited scope of conduct encompassed by
Sections 47 and 144.209 First, 28 U.S.C. § 47 covers only “judges sitting
on courts of appeals who were recently appointed from the district court
or who are district judges sitting by designation, and directs their
disqualification from appeals of cases they decided as trial judges.”210
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 144 addresses only disqualification for actual bias,
which is difficult to prove and risky for parties to allege, and “applies only
to district judges[.]”211 In contrast, Section 455 covers all federal jurists
(except arguably the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court) and requires
disqualification for actual, probable, and apparent bias.212 Thus, the main
federal statute for disqualification is 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Under Section 455, a federal jurist may be disqualified under either an
“actual” or “apparent” bias standard.213 However, because actual bias is
so difficult to prove and the statute mandates disqualification even upon
the lesser showing of an “appearance” of judicial bias, most
disqualification disputes are decided based upon grounds other than actual
actual bias”).
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2012) (“No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision
of a case or issue tried by him.”); Id. at § 144 (“Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court
makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has
a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.”); see also
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL LAW 2-3 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW] (explaining the scope
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, and 255, as well as the contours of 28 U.S.C. § 2106 which permits a federal
appellate court to remand and reassign the case).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”); see
also AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW, supra note 207, at 2-3 (explaining the narrow scope of 28
U.S.C. §§ 47 and 144, and the broader reach of 28 U.S.C. § 255).
209. 28. U.S.C. §§ 47, 144.
210. AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW, supra note 208, at 3.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 49–50.
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bias, relying instead upon the more commonly used appearance of bias
standard.214 Since both the actual bias and appearance of bias standards
are included in these statutes, often both standards are pled by the moving
party and courts regularly combine and sometimes confuse the two
standards in their analyses.215 However, both the litigants and courts
often rely upon the lesser appearance of bias standard, which seems to be
less critical of the challenged jurist’s ethics because it does not require
impugning the jurist’s actual motives.216 The appearance of bias standard
is, therefore, the focus here as well.
There are two different parts of 28 U.S.C. § 455 that mandate
disqualification based upon the appearance of bias standard. First, under
subpart (a) of Section 455, a federal court jurist “shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
This standard has been interpreted to require
questioned.”217
disqualification “when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts,”
would believe the jurist may be biased and does not require a showing of
subjective bias.218 The general disqualification standard of Section 455(a)
is augmented in subpart (b) by a list of specific circumstances, which per se
constitute disqualifying conditions.219
Each of those enumerated
conditions makes clear the external circumstances (the facts regarding the
jurist’s finances, relationships with parties or counsel, and any extra-judicial
role in the case) mandate disqualification, regardless of the jurist’s
thoughts, feelings, or opinions.220 Thus, Section 455 provides two

214. See id. at 49–50 (finding overlap in standards and remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28
U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), and observing most courts’ analysis of recusal requests under those statutes often
confuse the two standards).
215. See Sande L. Buhai, Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis,
90 OR. L. REV. 69, 80–81 (2011) (discussing the overlap in standards between actual and apparent
bias and lamenting both litigants and courts often combine or conflate the grounds for
disqualification, thereby causing problems in evaluating disqualification decisions based upon
allegations of actual bias).
216. Id.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012).
218. See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 848 (1988) (holding if a
reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts as they actually existed, would believe the judge should
have known of the conflict, then the judge may be retroactively disqualified under Section 455).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006).
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (using the term “shall” to convey the mandatory nature of the statute).
Before its amendment in 1974, Section 455 provided for a subjective test for determining whether
disqualification was warranted:
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different legal standards that both employ an objective test for determining
whether disqualification is required.
2. State Court Substantive Standards for Disqualification
Like in the federal court system, most state disqualification disputes are
decided based upon one of three sources of law: (1) due process
provisions of the state constitution; (2) state statutory law; or (3) state
judicial ethics codes.221 Most, if not all of these substantive standards,
appear to require an objective assessment of whether the alleged bias does
or at least appears to exist sufficient to warrant the jurist stepping
down.222 In the majority of states, there is no explicit constitutional right
to disqualify a jurist; rather, if such a right exists, it is based upon
application of the Due Process Clause, which has been interpreted to
require recusal when actual bias exists.223 The disqualification standards
provided in the statutes adopted in twenty-nine states can be categorized
as follows: (1) five states seem to require a showing of actual bias; and
(2) twenty-four states require disqualification upon the lesser showing of
an appearance of partiality.224 However, the statutory law in the
remaining twenty-one states is not easily grouped into a single

Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or
connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on
the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (emphasis added).
221. RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, § 5.2, at 42–45 (outlining
the applicable sources of law in the states).
222. See Serbulea, supra note 105, at 1151–72 (examining the recusal laws of the fifty states).
223. See id. (listing the constitutions of twelve states that include provisions interpreted to
require disqualification of judicial officers). Most of those state constitutional provisions are due
process clauses. See id. (providing an appendix with each state’s applicable laws on judicial recusal).
However, a handful of state constitutions—those adopted in Arkansas, California, Maryland, and
Texas—include explicit standards for judicial disqualification. See id. at 1169–70 (explaining the
specific standards in these states; for example, California requires disqualification if a judge has “been
indicted or recommended for removal or retirement,” while Texas disqualifies judges who have an
“interest in the case, relationship to the parties, or for having been of counsel in the matter, but not
for bias”).
224. See id. at 1122–23, 1123 n.108 (identifying the five states requiring actual bias as Arizona,
Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and South Carolina); see also RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES, supra note 69, §§ 27.1–27.19, at 789–822 (identifying only eighteen states that permit some
form of peremptory challenge that requires no showing of cause).
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classification, although all appear to require evidence of something less
than actual bias.225
The most common formulation of the standard in those remaining
states is the “appearance of impropriety” or “appearance of partiality” test,
which asks the decisionmaker to evaluate the evidence of possible bias in
the same manner a reasonable and informed other would.226 Although a
minority of states permit some form of peremptory challenge, most limit
that right to one challenge per party per case, so any party desiring to
disqualify any substituted jurist must meet the applicable “for cause”
standard.227 In other words, the majority of state disqualification laws,
whether based upon state constitutions or state statutes, employ an
objective test and do not rely upon the jurist’s subjective thoughts,
feelings, or opinion about his own actual, probable, or apparent bias.
3. Federal and State Judicial Ethics Codes Require Recusal for Actual,
Probable, or Apparent Bias
In addition to the constitutional and statutory grounds for
disqualification, both federal and state court jurists (with the possible
exception of the U.S. Supreme Court)228 are subject to ethical rules that
225. See Serbulea, supra note 105, at 1122–23 n.108 (admitting “the law is unclear in the rest of
the states”); see also RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, §§ 5.1–5.2, at 103–
08 (labeling both the “appearance of impropriety” and “appearance of bias” standards “objective
assessments”).
226. See id. (claiming that forty six of the fifty states—excluding Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and
Wisconsin—have adopted the “appearance of bias” standard and held it requires the challenged jurist
to step aside whenever “a reasonable person would think [the jurist] might not be absolutely
detached and impartial”). This requires the decisionmaker to view the external evidence of possible
bias.
227. See Serbulea, supra note 105, at 1123 n.105 (noting seventeen states permit disqualification
without cause and three states use quasi-peremptory rules); see also RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supra note 69, § 27.1, at 790 (noting “a substantial minority of
mostly western or mid-western jurisdictions . . . permit parties to seek disqualification on a
peremptory basis, without any showing of cause”); JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS: SETTING
RECUSAL STANDARDS 5 (2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/fair_courts_
setting_recusal_standards (“About a third of the states already permit counsel to strike one judge per
proceeding.”).
228. See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 156, at 7 (stating “the limits of Congress’s power
to require recusal [of U.S. Supreme Court Justices] have never been tested”), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf; see also James Sample, Supreme
Court Recusal from Marbury to the Modern Day, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 99 (2013) (suggesting
recusal rules for the U.S. Supreme Court should be different given the Court’s place within our
judiciary and democracy); Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards,
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require an assessment of alleged actual, probable, or apparent bias. The
federal judicial ethics code, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
(“Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges”), which has been adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, is the guide for determining
when circumstances create an “appearance of impropriety” requiring the
federal jurist to step aside and not hear a case.229 The ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct (“ABA Judicial Code”) provides the yardstick for
disqualification in state court systems because significant parts have been
adopted by all fifty states.230 It is not clear whether either of these ethical
codes has the force of law. The ABA Judicial Code being merely a model
code is not binding though it provides persuasive authority for purposes of
disciplining jurists for ethical misconduct.231 Likewise, there is some
question regarding the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges because the
Judicial Conference may lack authority to enact binding ethics rules for
jurists.232 Nevertheless, the ethical standard expressed in both the Code
of Conduct for U.S. Judges and the ABA Judicial Code is afforded great
deference by courts deciding disqualification disputes.233 Thus, the
influence of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and the ABA Judicial
Code on disqualification standards permeates throughout the federal and
state judicial branches.
The recusal provisions under both the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
and the ABA Judicial Code, which are virtually indistinguishable, use the

2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1218 (2011) (arguing Congressional attempts to define the recusal standards
for the U.S. Supreme Court violates the constitutional separation of powers and offends federalism
principles).
229. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV.
1213, 1229–32 (2002) (discussing the standard where a judge may be disqualified if “the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including personal bias, prejudice about the facts or a
party to a case, or when the jurist or a member of the jurist’s family has an pecuniary interest in the
subject matter or a party in the case).
230. Marie McManus Degnan, Comment, No Actual Bias Needed: The Intersection of Due Process and
Statutory Recusal, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 227 (2010) (describing the ethical rules adopted and applied
in federal and state courts).
231. Of course, as a model code, the ABA Judicial Code lacks the force of law unless a
jurisdiction elects to adopt its provisions. Forty-nine of the fifty states adopted the 1972 edition of
the ABA Judicial Code by 2002. While some judicial codes are afforded the status of law in some
states, other states use the ABA Judicial Code as a guideline for judicial ethics. Bassett, supra note
229, at 1229–30.
232. Id. at 1230.
233. See id. at 1235 (noting disqualification cases are reviewed for abuse of discretion which
“accords too much deference to the” lower court’s ruling).
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same two-part framework for deciding disqualification disputes.234 Under
both of these judicial ethics codes, there are two basic scenarios that
require recusal of a jurist: (1) when the jurist actually or probably is not
impartial; or (2) when it appears to a reasonable person that the jurist
might not be impartial.235 In the first step of the analysis, recusal is
required if any one of a non-exhaustive list of per se disqualifying
conditions is met.236 These per se standards require recusal when a jurist is
either (a) actually partial based upon personal bias against a party or the
party’s lawyer or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute or
(b) presumed to be partial based upon a number of other specific
circumstances related to the jurist’s (and his family’s) finances,
relationships with litigants and parties, or extra-judicial knowledge and
roles related to the case.237 If the facts satisfy any one of these
enumerated circumstances, the jurist shall step aside and no discretion is
involved.238 Since the list is not exhaustive, even if the facts do not
warrant recusal under one of the enumerated per se standards, the jurist
may still be disqualified under the catch-all provision.239 In the second
234. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 832–34 (comparing the substantive
disqualification standards under both judicial ethics codes). Since the language of the two ethics
codes is nearly identical (and the differences are not relevant here), this discussion will treat the rules
as the same and focus on the ABA Judicial Code.
235. See id. at 829 (discussing the ABA Judicial Code’s dual standards). An argument can be
made that the enumerated standards other than for actual bias–unless bias is presumed–are akin to a
probability of bias standard.
236. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3(C)(1)(a)–(d) (AM. BAR.
ASS’N 2014) (providing factors relevant to the disqualification analysis); see also MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2011) (articulating six factors for determining
disqualifications). Not all states have adopted all of the enumerated disqualifying circumstances. See
Degnan, supra note 231, at 227 (noting each state has adopted significant portions of the ABA Model
Code but not in its entirety). In fact, the part of the rule disqualification based upon campaign
contributions by interested parties has been adopted in only one state. Id. at 228 n.27.
237. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(C)(1)(a)–(d)(a) (AM. BAR.
ASS’N 2014) (contrasting the two model codes where the ABA Judicial Code does not include actual
bias against a party’s attorney as grounds for disqualification); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(1)–(6) (2011).
238. See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might
Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 57–58 (2000) (noting “shall” was substituted
for “should” when the ABA Judicial Code was amended in 1990). In 1990, the term “should” was
replaced with the currently used “shall” in all the canons and rules making the provisions of the ABA
Judicial Code mandatory. Id. at 58.
239. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(C)(1)
cmt. Canon3(C)(1)(d)(ii) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2014) (stating even if the per se rule is not satisfied, recusal
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step of the analysis, the catch-all disqualification standard is invoked when
the facts do not fit within one of the enumerated per se rules, but the
judge’s impartiality nevertheless “might reasonably be questioned.”240
Both the specific per se and more general catch-all standards for
disqualification under the federal and state judicial ethics codes require an
objective assessment of the jurist’s impartiality, rather than an subjective
assessment. The first step of the disqualification analysis, made under the
per se rules (with the possible exception of the actual bias rule), requires
evaluation of external facts measured from an objective perspective, not
the subjective state of mind of the challenged jurist.241 The second
disqualification standard, when the “judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned,” is evaluated not from the perspective of the challenged
jurist but from the point of view of the reasonable person—this being the
hypothetical “other” in the law.242 Thus, regardless of whether
disqualification is based upon the six enumerated per se circumstances or
the “might reasonably be questioned” catch-all provision, the evaluation of
partiality under these judicial ethics codes embodies an objective standard
that relies on external evidence of bias.

may still be required under Canon3(C)(1) if the interest “could be ‘substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding’”); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(1)–(6) (2011)
(providing six standards for disqualification).
240. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(C)(1) (AM. BAR. ASS’N
2014) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR.
ASS’N 2011) (“Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1)
through (6) apply.”).
241. See Abramson, supra note 238, at 59–60 (evaluating the need to address individual objective
facts when a judge’s impartiality is in question). For example, the decision-maker must evaluate
whether the jurist previously played a particular role in the case, if the jurist or a related person has a
known direct or indirect economic interest in the case, or whether the jurist or related party may be a
material witness. It does not matter what the challenged jurist believes about these connections to
the case.
242. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2011) (“The test
for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception
that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s
honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”); see also Abramson, supra note 238,
at 58–59 (explaining the challenged jurist’s subjective evaluation of the potentially disqualifying
circumstances will differ from the assessment a reasonable other would make of the same situation).
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B. An Objective Assessment of Bias Promotes the Purposes of Impartiality
Using an objective substantive standard to determine judicial bias makes
sense given that the primary purposes of disqualification are to
(1) safeguard the litigants’ right to a fair trial by disqualifying actually or
probably biased jurists and (2) promote public confidence in the courts by
ensuring the appearance of impartiality is maintained.243
The
disqualification standard is an objective one when it is focused on external
evidence of the challenged jurist’s actual, probable, or apparent bias—his
words and deeds. This externally focused standard is critical to measuring
how a reasonable “other” would view the situation, which is required for
the appearance of bias standard.244 While a subjective standard for
determining actual or probable bias may suffice when the bias is conscious,
only an objective standard can adequately address nonconscious bias, even
when actual.245 Also, the use of a subjective standard in assessing
probable or apparent bias would be improper because we cannot detect
nonconscious bias, even by examining the internal evidence—the
challenged jurist’s thoughts, feelings and opinions.246 Thus, the applicable
243. See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 149, at 513 (discussing the primary
purposes underlying the rule of impartiality in the context of disqualification as protecting individual
rights to a fair trial in specific cases and creating confidence in the legal system generally). However,
at least one commentator has asserted that disqualification based upon the Due Process Clause need
only avoid actual bias and that concerns regarding the public’s confidence in the courts are
overblown and could be properly addressed by requiring jurists to provide explanations of their
disqualification decisions. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 45–
46 (2007) (analyzing alternative proposals for addressing issues of judicial impartiality and suggesting
new procedures for judicial recusal).
244. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 834 (discussing the use of external evidence
to assess bias in others).
245. See Pub. Util. Comm. of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging the subconscious may lead to biased decision-making). The most
notable instance of a jurist stepping down due to actual bias happened when Justice Frankfurter
recused himself from hearing a case challenging the practice of playing the radio on public buses
because his feelings were “so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy” it was
better for him “not [to] participate in judicial judgment upon it.” Id. at 467. Justice Frankfurter
further stated his belief that most judges can, given their judicial “training, professional habits, [and]
self-discipline[,]” set aside their feelings and judge impartially; however, Justice Frankfurter also
stated that he worried that his “unconscious feelings” on the subject were so strong they might
operate on a sub-conscious level and affect the outcome or—at the very least—”unfairly lead others
to believe they are [so] operating.” Id. at 466–67. Thus, he took no part in consideration of the case.
Id. at 467.
246. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 827–28 (discussing prevalence of an
objective standard based upon external evidence compared to the use of introspective evidence to
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substantive standards properly use an objective test to protect litigants’
rights by preventing actually or probably biased jurists from hearing
litigants’ cases and maintaining public confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding both the probability and the appearance of partiality.247
C. Federal Courts and Most State Courts Use Self-Disqualification Procedures
While the federal and state courts use procedures that differ in some
ways when determining disqualification disputes, most of those procedures
are defective because they allow “self-disqualification.”248 In other words,
the challenged jurist is permitted to make the initial determination of
whether he actually is, probably is, or appears to be sufficiently biased as to
warrant disqualification. All the federal courts use self-disqualification
procedures.249
Also, despite the availability of limited rights to
peremptory challenges in a minority of states, the same problems of selfdisqualification plague the state courts as well.250 Although most of those
disqualification decisions (other than at the U.S. Supreme Court) are
subject to some form of appellate review, the avenues for appeal, the costs
of pursuing an appeal, and the lenient standard of review (usually clearly
erroneous or abuse of discretion) makes it unlikely that an incorrect
self-disqualification decision will be corrected on appeal.251 Thus, in both
the federal and state courts the affected parties have little, if any,
meaningful opportunity to seek redress when the self-disqualification
decision is wrong and the jurist incorrectly refuses to recuse.

assess bias in self).
247. See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009) (“The Court asks not
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is
‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”).
248. See Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse: Self-Judging and the Reasonable Person Problem,
33 J.L. PROF. 85, 96–97 (2008) (labeling this phenomenon as “self-judging”). But, that is a misnomer
because, as the author concedes, the jurist who is the target of the disqualification motion is not on
trial. Id. at 97. Moreover, the jurist has no financial or other personal interest at stake in the case. Id.
Thus, a better label for this phenomenon and the one used in this Article is “self-disqualification.”
249. See RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES supra note 69, at 692, 721 (describing
federal court procedures and implying the challenged jurist makes the initial disqualification decision).
250. See id. at 753–56 (discussing state court procedures for disqualification and implying the
use of self-disqualification procedures used in state courts and noting that after an initial peremptory
challenge another procedure is used).
251. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 864–65 (discussing the limitations on
meaningful appellate review of incorrect self-disqualification decisions).
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VI. REFORMING RECUSAL RULES TO ELIMINATE THE BIAS BLIND SPOT
Unfortunately, in spite of the bench’s well-meaning intention to
objectively apply the substantive disqualification standards, the common
use of self-disqualification procedures undermines the decision-making
process in specific disqualification disputes and erodes the public’s
confidence in the judiciary in general. The chancy combination of the
self-disqualification procedures, the objective reasonable person standard,
and the impact of the bias blind spot creates an asymmetry in perceptions
of judicial bias between the bench and bar, as well as between the bench
and the public. To bridge that gap in perceptions and misperceptions of
bias, a different balance must be struck between the bench’s strong
self-perception of impartiality and the others’ increasingly skeptical view of
judicial integrity. The solution to this problem lies in reassessing the
presumption of impartiality and reforming recusal rules to reflect the
realities of actual judging rather than an idealistic view of judges.
A. Perceptions and Misperceptions of Bias in Disqualification Disputes
In spite of most jurists’ stated support of an objective test for
determining judicial bias, there are sound reasons to believe many jurists
do not apply disqualification standards objectively, especially when selfdisqualification procedures are used. First, there is anecdotal evidence of
jurists being less than objective when applying the disqualification
standards—including decisions made by the challenged jurists in Caperton,
Williams, and the high-profile cases referenced in this Article and analyzed
in other scholarly and news articles.252 Second, there is scientific evidence
of cognitive illusions—similar to the bias blind spot—impacting judicial
decision-making.253 Third, there is evidence of how the bias blind spot
affects all of us when assessing our own biases from which we can
appreciate the likely impact of this particular cognitive illusion upon
disqualification decisions.254 Finally, there is evidence of the impact of
the bias blind spot and other cognitive illusions on the disqualification
decisions that jurists have actually made in specific cases.255 Thus, the
252. See cases discussed supra Part II.
253. See cases discussed supra Part IV.A.2, IV.B.
254. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 840 (explaining people are typically blind to
their own biases, but they are quick to observe the same biases in others).
255. See Sande L. Buhai, Federal Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis, 90 OR. L.
REV. 69, 70–71, 107 (2011) (examining statistical analysis of over 1000 federal appeals from
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impact of the bias blind spot on disqualification disputes is pretty clear and
the solution lies in reassessing the combination of procedures and
substantive standards used to make the decisions.
The problems with current disqualification practice are exacerbated by
the asymmetry in perceptions and misperceptions of bias between the
bench, on the one hand, and the bar and public, on the other hand. This
disconnect is particularly evident in the most high-profile cases, which are
often politically charged, and thus, make jurists more susceptible to
allegations of bias—whether fair or unfair.256 Given the high stakes in
such cases (including abortion, death penalty, judicial and other elections,
health insurance reform, and same sex marriage), and our increasingly
polarized political climate, these situations require the greatest amount of
public confidence in the fairness of the decision-making process in order
for the decisions to be respected and carried out by others.257 Thus, we
must address this disconnect in perceptions of bias between the jurists
(especially those who are permitted to use self-disqualifying procedures)
and the others—litigants, the bar, and the general public—who are
expected to abide by the ruling.
B. Reforming Recusal Rules to Eliminate Misperceptions of Judicial Bias
There are two basic types of recusal reform that have been proposed in
recent years: (1) changes to the substantive standards; and (2) procedural
reforms. However, to date, none of the proposed reforms have solved the
problems of perception and misperception of judicial bias or seriously
reinvigorated public confidence in judicial impartiality.
1. Past Proposed Reforms of Substantive Standards
The proposed reforms of substantive standards seem to fall into one of
two categories. First, some scholars and other commentators have
advocated for the addition of more per se rules that address the latest
problems in disqualification—mostly troubles with judicial elections.258
disqualification decisions and noting that “the data suggest that cognitive illusions do play a role in
federal recusal decisions” especially when certain grounds for disqualification are alleged).
256. See cases discussed supra Part II (discussing high profile cases and public reaction to same).
257. See discussion supra Part II (discussing of need for public confidence in judiciary).
258. See Deborah Goldberg et. al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform,
46 WASHBURN L.J 503, 529 (2007) (“By setting a maximum threshold, the ABA’s per se rule
eliminates lawyers’ incentive to curry favor through large contributions.”); see also Courts, Campaigns,
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Second, others, including current or former jurists, have called for the
rejection of the appearance of a bias standard to eliminate the gap in
perceptions of judicial bias.259 The intent behind the second category of
suggested changes is to bring the articulated standard for
disqualification—whether a particular factual circumstance or the legal
standard for finding bias—in line with the way the standards are actually
applied by the bench. Unfortunately, there has been little consensus about
which substantive changes properly balance judicial accountability and
judicial independence, the values that underlie most disqualification
disputes.260 So, despite the merit of some of these suggested reforms,
there has been little reform of the substantive standards used by the
federal and state courts and perceptions and misperceptions of bias
continue to divide us.
2. Past Proposed Reforms of Procedural Practices
The procedural reform proposals have included a variety of suggested
changes that likewise have been less than fully effective due to poor
implementation. Some commentators have suggested disqualification
disputes should be handled no differently and use the same key procedures
employed in other aspects of the adversarial process.261 Still other
observers have advocated more narrowly tailored reforms, including
educating jurists and requiring that jurists write and publish opinions when

and Corruption: Judicial Recusal Five Years After Caperton, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://www.brennancenter.org/event/courts-campaigns-and-corruption-judicial-recusal-five-yearsafter-caperton (“The American Bar Association’s most recent attempt to create model recusal
rules . . . [addressed] the new reality of increased campaign contributions and independent
expenditures in state judicial races. There was debate as to whether judicial recusal should be
addressed through reforms to ethical rules or procedural rules . . . .”).
259. See Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably Be
Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 417 (2014) (noting the appearance
regime has been a documented failure and proposing to replace it with a procedural regime that
includes peremptory challenges); see also Cravens, supra note 243, at 2, 10 (stating the “appearancebased recusal and disqualification standards are ill-conceived and ineffective” and addressing the
need for a consistent and reliable procedural structure); Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note
74, at 732 (“[T]he appearances paradigm is crumbling because it has been balkanized . . . . [A]
resurrected and revitalized procedural regime . . . holds considerable promise.”).
260. See id. at 677 (explaining there is no agreement between the legal establishment and the
public regarding what constitutes an appearance of partiality).
261. Frost, supra note 111, at 555–57 (describing five key procedural protections that result in
legitimate judicial decisions, including impartial decision-makers).
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disqualification is denied (and sometimes even when it is granted).262 In
recent years, a number of scholars—including some of the most
prominent judicial ethics scholars—have focused their reform proposals
on eliminating self-disqualification procedures as a needed change in
disqualification practice.263 However, to date, few courts have adopted
these meritorious proposals for procedural reform.264 Even the U.S.
Supreme Court has side-stepped the chance to reinvigorate recusals by
declining to adopt procedural reforms despite calls from scholars, nonprofit groups, and others for elimination of self-disqualification.265 Thus,
the divide in perceptions and misperceptions of bias in disqualification
disputes remains unchanged.
3. Reluctant Recusants and the Need for Judicial Acceptance of
Reforms
There is a significant reason for this lack of progress in recusal reforms:
an important participant—the judiciary—has been reluctant to embrace
proposed changes in disqualification practices. This resistance to reform
has a long pedigree in American disqualification jurisprudence.266 The
reasons given for jurists’ reluctance vary and include differing beliefs
262. See Flamm, supra note 101, at 760 (“[F]ederal judges who are called upon to decide
disqualification motions are under no obligation to explain their rationale either for recusing
themselves or declining to do so. This is problematic . . . ”).
263. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1564, 1578–79 (2013) (highlighting all participants in the legal
community are susceptible to nonconscious bias and judges who preside over their own recusal
hearings, harbor the same implicit biases as others, which can “infect judicial rulings, orders, and
decisions”); see also Hayes, supra note 248, at 97, 101 (noting the disqualification process stands alone
because it is virtually the only area of law where “judges are empowered to make their own decisions
despite having a stake in the result” and suggesting the biases these judges hold may unwittingly lead
them down a path of impartiality); see also Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10 (discussing the
various recusal procedures currently used by federal and state courts and proposing reforms designed
to address the impact of the bias blind spot in disqualification decisions).
264. See discussion supra Part III.A.4 (discussing lack of reforms since Caperton and describing
exception in Georgia, which did reform its procedures to largely eliminate self-disqualification).
265. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 875 (noting J. Benjamin’s concurring
opinion addressing his refusal to recuse); see also Brief for Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU School of Law and Justice at Stake in Support of Petitioner et al. at 3, 13, Williams v.
Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 15-5040), 2015 WL 8138320 (arguing modern social
science literature has recognized fundamental implicit biases that evidence a tendency for a person to
ignore impartiality, and due to such evidence, states such as Michigan and Tennessee, have
implemented “independent review of recusal decisions made by justices of each State’s supreme
court”).
266. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing vicious cycle of resistance, reform, and repeat).
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about the proper balance between judicial independence and
accountability, the impact of cognitive illusions and other psychological
factors on judicial decision-making, and the proper perception of judicial
integrity, which underlies the presumption of impartiality.267 While it is
difficult to know the exact reasons for this ongoing power struggle, it is
clear that the judiciary will have to be on board before reforms will be
implemented in any meaningful way.268 Thus, this Article proposes more
modest changes to disqualification practices with the hopes that jurists will
adopt, rather than resist, these recusal reforms, which are designed to both
protect litigants’ legal rights and safeguard the entire judiciary’s welldeserved reputation for fairness.
C. Reinvigorating Recusals by Eliminating the Bias Blind Spot and Rebalancing the
Presumption of Impartiality
Many proposed reforms take something of an all or nothing approach
to recusal, but this Article suggests a compromise designed to strike a
better balance between the competing views about the proper strength of
the presumption of judicial impartiality while also eliminating the impact
of the bias blind spot. The proposals to entirely dismantle the appearancebased recusal regime have not succeeded and, likewise, the calls for
eliminating self-disqualification have fallen on deaf ears.269 While these
reform proposals have real merit, they are not resonating with the bench
and are, therefore, unlikely to be fully implemented. At least one wellknown judicial ethics scholar, Charles Gardner Geyh, has suggested the
reason for judicial reluctance to embrace recusal reforms is really about
disagreements over two fundamental issues: (1) whether jurists should
enjoy a strong presumption of impartiality; and (2) what, if any, interests

267. See supra Part III.B.1 (exploring the reasons for historical and continuing judicial resistance
to recusal reform).
268. Even if others—notably federal and state legislatures—could agree on the proper reforms,
there is a serious question about whether another branch of government has the power to write
binding judicial recusal rules. See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 156, at 7 (stating “the limits
of Congress’s power to require recusal [of U.S. Supreme Court Justices] have never been tested”); see
also Virelli, supra note 228, at 1218 (arguing Congressional attempts to define the recusal standards for
the U.S. Supreme Court violates the constitutional Separation of Powers and offends federalism
principles).
269. See supra Part VI.A (discussing suggested reforms to substantive standards and procedural
practices used in disqualification disputes and noting that few, if any, have been adopted fully by the
courts).
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(personal, relational, political) are required to overcome that
presumption.270 This Article builds upon this idea, but adds one
additional factor: what evidence, in terms of type and amount, is required
to overcome that presumption. This third factor is aimed at the
asymmetry in perceptions of bias between “self” versus “other” and is
strongly influenced by who makes the disqualification decision. In other
words, this last factor combines concerns of procedural practices with the
substantive standards being employed by the disqualification
decisionmaker.
To strike the correct balance between these competing views of judicial
impartiality, it will help to very clearly define the tensions currently
reflected in disqualification practice. Those tensions encompass both the
substantive standards and the procedural practices used in the federal and
most state courts and the balancing point is the presumption of
impartiality, which underlies nearly every aspect of disqualification
practice. The spectrum of assumptions regarding impartiality that underlie
disqualification practice can be demonstrated graphically:
Actual Bias

Probable Bias

Apparent Bias

Formalist

Mix of
Formalist/Realist

Realist

Strong Presumption

Modest Presumption

Weaker Presumption

More Evidence of Bias

Moderate
Evidence of Bias

Less Evidence of Bias

The tug of war can best be seen by looking at how the fight shows up at
each edge of this spectrum. On the one side are those who believe most
in a strong presumption of impartiality and often pull for the elimination
of the appearance-based regime, which they perceive as undermining
judicial independence through judge shopping and other tactics sometimes
used by litigants. Also, these substantive reforms seldom address the
procedural practices used by courts in making disqualification decisions.
270. See Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, supra note 74 at 676 (discussing the failure of the
current appearances regime and suggesting changes are due to a deep divide between the bench on
the one hand and the bar and public on the other hand over “when it is reasonable for the
presumption of impartiality to yield to the suspicion that extralegal influences may have
compromised the judge’s impartial judgment”).
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On the other side are those who are skeptical of jurists’ ability to see their
own biases, and, therefore believe in a weaker presumption of impartiality.
They often argue for elimination of self-disqualification and adoption of
other procedural reforms without regard to the substantive standard being
applied. This Article proposes a middle ground in this tug of war: a twoprong approach that addresses both substantive and procedural concerns
by recommending that all federal and state courts adopt one of two
substantive standards for disqualification depending on who makes the
initial disqualification decision.
1. Weaker Presumption for Self-Disqualification Decisions
The first prong of the proposal requires that if a court decides to
continue using self-disqualification procedures, then the challenged jurist’s
authority to decide should be limited. Specifically, if the challenged jurist
is the initial decisionmaker, then the disqualification decision should be
limited to applying the specific per se rules for partiality and passing on the
legal sufficiency (though not the accuracy) of the factual allegations of bias
when the catch-all provision is applied. In both instances, the evidentiary
standard should remain the appearance of bias standard because this is the
lowest of the evidentiary thresholds for finding bias and it better accounts
for the impact of the bias blind spot on the challenged jurist’s perceptions
of his own bias versus others’ perceptions of his bias.271 Of course, if the
catch-all provision is used also, then another jurist must make that
disqualification decision following the substantive standards set forth in
the next section.
2. Stronger Presumption for Other Disqualification Decisions
The second prong of the proposed reforms proposal is if a court
decides to discontinue using self-disqualification procedures and have a
decisionmaker other than the challenged jurist, then the authority of those
other decisionmakers should be plenary. If a jurist other than the
challenged jurist (e.g., another member of the same court, the entire court,
or another court) is the initial decisionmaker, then there should be no limit
on the decisionmaker’s authority to decide disqualification claims made
under either the per se rules or the catch-all provisions, or both. Also,
given that the bias blind spot will have limited, if any, impact on these
271. See Reshaping Recusal Procedures, supra note 10, at 834–35 (discussing standards on which to
rely to determine “how a reasonable ‘other’ would view the situation”).
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other decisionmakers, a strong presumption of impartiality should be
applied and the higher evidentiary threshold of “probability of bias,” as
articulated in Caperton, must be met.
This two-pronged approach is designed to: (1) balance the realities of
judging (including the impact of the bias blind spot) against our ideals
about judges that are embedded in the presumption of impartiality; and
(2) avoid judicial resistance to reforms by recognizing the judiciary’s
generally well-deserved reputation for impartiality in most cases. The first
of these goals is achieved by recognizing, as these proposed reforms do,
that most jurists uphold their oaths of office; it further recognizes those
jurists strive to make the best disqualification decisions possible while at
the same time acknowledging that jurists sometimes fall short of that goal,
especially when using self-disqualification procedures. Based upon a
recent empirical study of federal appeals in disqualification disputes, it
appears that jurists are most likely to make less objective assessments of
their own impartiality when the certain grounds for disqualification are
alleged.272 In fact, the most problematic grounds reflected in this study
were: (1) general bias against a party; (2) general bias against counsel;
(3) professional or personal relationship with a party; (4) professional and
personal relationship with counsel; and (5) bias based upon strong ethical
or social convictions about an issue in the case.273 While there are some
distinctions between these categories of bias and the breakdown of the
per se rules and the catch-all provisions that serve as the basis for the
reforms recommended in this Article, there is enough overlap of the
groupings to support the proposed two-prong approach.274 Thus, the
proposal is to permit challenged jurists to decide disqualification disputes
that allege certain kinds of clearly delineated bias and require involvement
of other decisionmakers in the cases in which the bias blind spot is most
likely to impact the outcome due to the discretion involved. The second
272. See Sande L. Buhai, Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis,
90 OR. L. REV. 69, 107 (2011) (examining statistical analysis of over 1,000 federal appeals from
disqualification decisions and noting “the data suggest[s] that cognitive illusions do play a role in
federal recusal decisions[,]” especially when certain grounds for disqualification are alleged).
273. See id. at 105–08 (ranking the likelihood of reversal of the challenged jurist’s decision based
upon the grounds for disqualification alleged).
274. It is likely any differences are not real distinctions between the grounds for disqualification,
but instead are due to a difference in how the data was labeled and coded. However, since the study
does not reflect a direct comparison between the categories used and the provisions of the statutes or
rules relied upon by the litigants, the analysis in this Article is based upon the description of each
category in the study.
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goal is met by balancing a strong presumption of impartiality with
skepticism regarding the likelihood a jurist will realistically assess their own
personal biases but giving jurists the benefit of the doubt when others
make the disqualification decision. These proposed reforms should be
more palatable to an otherwise reluctant judiciary because the courts can
eliminate an appearance-based evidentiary standard and preserve the
stronger presumption of impartiality, when they adopt fairer
disqualification procedures that use unbiased jurists to decide the hardest
cases. Thus, the proposed dual standards offer the best way to protect
litigants’ due process rights to a fair trial while at the same time fostering
public confidence in the impartiality of jurists and the judiciary.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years a number of high profile disqualification disputes in the
federal and state courts have caught the attention of the media and the
public. These cases have involved controversial subjects such as abortion,
the death penalty, judicial elections, health insurance reform, and same-sex
marriage. In each instance, there has been an outcry from some segment
of the public and the press when a presiding jurist was asked to recuse but
declined to step aside. Unfortunately, even if the jurist writes a decision
explaining their refusal to recuse, the reasons given are often unsatisfying
and do little to quell suspicions of bias. Instead, the litigants, members of
the press, and the public are left questioning whether the jurist is actually
unbiased in the specific case and even doubting the impartiality of the
judiciary as a whole.
This negative reaction to refusals to recuse is caused, in part, by the bias
blind spot, which creates asymmetries in people’s perceptions of bias in
themselves versus their perception of bias in others. This difference in
perception also colors the jurist’s disqualification decisions and can lead, in
cases that seem obvious to persons other than the challenged jurist, to the
jurist presiding when recusal is required. These asymmetries in perception
of bias between the bench on the one hand, and the bar and public on the
other hand, conflict with the long-standing presumption of impartiality
that undergirds judicial recusal rules. In addition, these differences in
perceptions and presumptions of impartiality are exacerbated by the
politically charged context in which some disqualification decisions play
out further creating suspicions of the jurists’ motives. Thus, this Article
proposes reforms of the substantive standards applied in disqualification
disputes about how to decide when a jurist should be disqualified to

2017]

Reforming Recusal Rules

303

protect litigants’ rights to a fair tribunal and to bolster public confidence in
the judiciary.
Specifically, this Article recommends that all federal and state courts
adopt one of two substantive standards for disqualification depending on
who makes the initial disqualification decision. First, if the challenged
jurist is the initial decisionmaker, then the decision should be limited to
applying the specific per se rules for partiality and passing on the accuracy
of the factual allegations of bias when the catch-all substantive standard is
pled. In both instances, the evidentiary standard should remain the
appearance of bias standard because this lowest of the evidentiary
thresholds for finding bias better accounts for the impact the bias blind
spot is likely to have when self-disqualification procedures are used.
Second, if another jurist, the entire court, or another court is the
decisionmaker, then there should be no limit on the decisionmaker’s
authority to decide disqualification claims made under either the per se or
the catch-all rules, or both. Also, given that the bias blind spot will have
limited, if any, impact on these other decisionmakers, the higher
evidentiary threshold of probability of bias, as articulated in Caperton, must
be met. The hope is that these proposed reforms are sufficiently balanced
between the opposing views on judicial entitlement to a presumption of
impartiality in disqualification disputes in a way that will maximize the
possibility the courts actually implement the proposed changes to make
positive progress in disqualification disputes.

